Showing posts with label Kalam cosmological argument. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kalam cosmological argument. Show all posts

Sunday, December 11, 2011

Space-time, Quantum Mechanics, and the Cosmological Argument for God



While watching Brian Greene's excellent NOVA series "The Fabric of the Cosmos," I went back and opened up the book (still sitting unread on my shelf) and read it with interest.

Greene talks about space-time, hence the title "The Fabric of the Cosmos," and while thinking carefully on the subject of how space and time are interwoven, as proved by Einstein's theory of special relativity, I came to a very simple realization. Theologians who invoke the Cosmological Argument for God likely don't understand the first thing about cosmology.

A Christian asked me today whether or not it takes the same amount of faith to believe that the universe arose from a quantum singularity as it does to believe a God created it.

My answer was simply: no.


He then told me I should think more about the Kalam cosmological argument, and what the first premise entails, specifically that the universe began. Thus it was caused to begin. Therefore something outside of the universe must have caused it--and for the supernatural minded--this explanation is Goddidit.



I have several objections to the first premise.

As I considered time and space being part of the same fabric of reality, I realized that theologians have the wrong impression of beginnings. Their thinking fits the Newtonian idea that things which begin have causes. But quantum mechanics has blown that rationale up showing that the classical model of physics and how it depicts reality is largely misleading. It has been discovered that fully actualized particles pop in and out of existence all the time in what are called quantum fluctuations. 



Where I feel theologians are getting hung up is not on the notion that time, and so reality and thus all existence--must have a definite beginning--because this is in tune with cosmological observations, but that they feel the beginning of space-time denotes a cause because all things that begin--according to Newtonian reasoning--have causes (e.g., causality).


The problem is this theological consideration that because the universe began it must have had a cause is only true within the confines of the physical universe in which the physical laws already dictate that causes have effects. Without the fabric of the space-time continuum, beginnings and ends make little to no sense, so it would technically be incorrect to assert that everything that begins to exist has a cause before you establish causation. 


The statement "anything which begins to exist has a cause" is true only within the confines of the physical laws of the universe as they are known to us. Beyond the confines of space-time, however, the statement makes no sense whatsoever. 


To complicate matters even more, we must be aware that the past, present, and future all seem to be relative. As Brian Greene reminds us, "there is nothing in the laws of classical physics that says this direction is time future and that direction is time past."


This being the case, how can theologians, who abide by the strict adherence to classical reasoning, say there is a beginning or end at all? 


Again, I is apparent to me that their Newtonian reasoning (which only applies to one small part of the picture) has caused them to jump to the wrong conclusions about the underlying reality of the universe (thereby causing them to miss the bigger picture).


Additionally, to answer the often asked question of why there appears to be order in the universe, this too can be explained by the the increase of entropy from a low to high state. As Greene informs, "The big bang started the universe off in a state of low entropy, and that state appears to be the source of the order we currently see."

Likewise, the related question of why there is something rather than nothing (within the universe) can also be explained. The answer is gravity. Entropy x gravity = clumping. According to physicists, this clumping of matter is what creates stars and planets. Gravity, in other words, is why we have something rather than nothing in the universe.



The Cosmological argument merely asks what sparked that initial fluctuation that caused the big bang? But see, that is, once again, the Newtonian reasoning which presumes all things that begin have causes. In other words, theologians are making a categorical mistake of attributing a metaphysical cause to a temporal effect wherein that reasoning only fits within the framework of a temporal reality. 


Thus, according to the theologians reasoning, things which are acted upon (either physically or metaphysically) have effects and therefor must have causes. There are no random accidents. As Einstein lamented, "God does not play dice."  


Niels Bohr, one of the early pioneers of quantum mechanics, replied to Einstein, "Stop telling God what to do."


The question theoretical physicists and cosmologists are currently investigating is: what, if anything, was there before the big bang?

Recently new theories have emerged which go a long ways toward helping to explain the conditions of the universe prior to its onset. The anthropic principle, eternal inflation, and string theory (for example) all predict a cosmic multiverse. Although it is yet unproved--the fact that three main fields of physics all stumble upon the same prediction, seems to me, to be a good sign that there might be something to this premise.


Although these cutting edge theories are not yet confirmed, they do predict the universe we see, and are based off of the cosmological pieces of the puzzle we have thus far collected and pieced together. What's more--they are testable--and so are falsifiable. Falsifiability is important--because if we are wrong--then being falsified lets us find out our mistakes so that we may correct them.



God theories, on the other hand, predict absolutely nothing (i.e., have zero utility), and in many cases cannot be adequately falsified. 

Being asked to even entertain the notion of the Cosmological argument for the existence of God is the same as being asked to ignore all the current cosmological evidence we do have which leaves no room for the existence of such a being.
 God theories merely make the a priori assumption that God exists. That's faith--not science. 


Do we know for sure what happened before the big bang? No. But that doesn't mean we can just substitute any answer we like in place of our ignorance. We aren't merely drawing straws here at what the most probable answer is. 


We are in the process of looking for testable evidence. When we find it--we will know. Even if we never find out for certain how the universe came to be, then the only answer we could possibly give to the question of what caused the universe to begin to exist is: I don't know.

God never even enters the equation.


Let me turn the question around, why would anyone put their faith in God having created the universe when God fails to explain anything about the universe, but current competing model of cosmology seem to explain everything fairly well without invoking useless God theories?

My point is this, although science cannot say whether or not it is possible for God to exist or not, it does a good job of showing that any effects of his causes are so far entirely absent. That is to say we can see no noticeable signs of his interaction with the universe or his effect upon it. Meanwhile physics explains things quite well without God. 



Without any evidence of God's interaction upon the universe, God becomes redundant for explanations which don't need to invoke God, and thus the God hypothesis is mainly irrelevant. Such a being might as well not even exist.

Friday, July 22, 2011

Debunking the Kalam Cosmological Argument

This is the most thorough, well researched, video critique of the Kalam cosmological argument I've ever seen. 

Monday, May 30, 2011

The King of Bullshit: Part Deux


Back in October of 2010, I wrote a polemical called William Lane Craig = King of Bullshit. I still stand by that observation. Even so, it is a hotly contested observation, because there are many many Craig fans out there. Even though I am a detractor of William Lane Craig, I suppose one would have to be a type of fan before one would be willing to bother rebutting WLC in the first place. In that sense, I too am a fan, but I happen to be willing to do what most WLC fans aren’t capable of doing—being critical of WLC.

Regardless of how one engages in due criticism, I was recently criticized for offering “far more delusional bullshit” than anything WLC ever said.  In a recent attack on my article, I was informed that

This post is unintentionally ironic, for it contains far more delusional bullshit than anything I've ever heard Craig say. I won't go as far as claiming you're 'lying,' for as an advocate of "science, reason and intellectual integrity," I won't make the silly mistake of claiming far more than I can justify.

To which I replied:

Actually, I was using bullshit in the technical sense. Craig often
spews unfounded and unproved claims as a matter of fact, often falling
for his own rhetoric--and that is what a bullshitter technically is.

You're using 'bullshit' in the colloquial sense as an ad hominem, most
probably because you've confused the burden of proof.

Besides, I never claimed I I can prove a negative. All I am saying is
that Craig's positive claims are fallacy ridden, without evidence, and
unverified--therefore amount to little more than BS. I refer you to
Graham Oppy's 'Arguing about Gods' for some reasons why what Craig
claims is a matter of fact is, in fact, not.

Now this is where things got interesting. Because my reader felt I was misusing the term “bullshit.” He stated:

That's not quite right. Bullshit in the Frankfurtian sense denotes an utter disregard for the truth or falsity of a claim. If, as you say, Craig “spews unfounded and unproved claims as a matter of fact” (which is itself a false claim, but let’s put that aside for the moment), and often falls “for his own rhetoric,” then it seems that the best we can conclude is that Craig is confused or delusional, and not Bullshitting. 

Savvy readers will recall that I was, in fact, stating that Craig often exhibits an utter disregard for the truth or falsity of a claim. Indeed, I quoted him saying that very exact thing! In his book Reasonable Faith Craig affirms:

Should a conflict arise between the witness of the Holy Spirit to the fundamental truth of the Christian faith and beliefs based on argument and evidence, then it is the former which must take precedence over the latter, not vice versa.  (Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, Revised edition, Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1994, p. 36.)

By Craig’s own admission that he would gladly disregard beliefs based on evidence and sound arguments if it should conflict with his face! By the Frankfurtian sense, then, this qualifies as pure bullshit. Luckily, however, I wasn’t speaking in the Frankfurtian sense, but rather, I was specifically using the George Carlin sense of the word. However, in my opinion, if you need to have someone get a dictionary out to explain bullshit to them, either they’re dumber than you thought they were, or it’s probably not they who have the problem in recognizing bullshit when they see it (just an FYI).

He went on to add:

But there’s a further problem. You accuse Craig of lying in your post, which you seem to think is follows from being a Bullshitter. But being a Bulshitter is distinct from being a liar (as Frankfurt makes clear). The Bullshitter misrepresents, but he does not lie. So which is it -- is Craig a Bullshitter or a liar? Or is he a Bullshitter some of the time, and a liar at other times?

Exactly! The latter part that is. Admittedly, amid my rhetorical parrying, I may have engaged in some question begging. Indeed, I didn’t make the distinction between a WLC Lie and a WLC pile of BS.  I didn’t think such a distinction was necessary. But apparently I was mistaken.

A WLC pile of BS is like the above example where he claims that a little magical man lives inside him, and that this little magical man is more right than anything in the world, and therefore is real world evidence and logic should disagree with the little magical man—then Craig confesses he’s going to side with the little magic man and not the valid, factual, evidence.

So when Craig claims that he knows what he knows because of the little magic man inside him, we know we are dealing with a case of WLC BS.

A WLC Lie, on the other hand, is something quite different (my commenter was right to point out the fact that there is a distinction). A WLC lie goes something like this: Craig will often state a truth claim—such as God exists, or that the universe is caused, etc. The problem here is this, with regard to the universe even our best scientists, cosmologists, and theoretical physicists do not know exactly how the universe came about. They have theories, based off evidence and observation, which is more than Craig can claim (his argument is that God caused the universe and that we can know this because of the properties of the universe distinctly happen to reveal a Creator—never mind this is a horrible case of circular reasoning).

The lie here is implicit—Craig is saying that he is right, but then (as we have seen) makes the habit of admitting he prefers not to rely on evidence when it should contradict his heartfelt convictions (eh-hem… I mean the little magic man inside him), and this wouldn’t be such a problem if we were dealing with a crazy person. But WLC is (supposedly) a well respected philosopher. Yet the problem is two-fold, because here we have a theologian making a scientific statement which flies in the face of the entire scientific community. In other words, Craig is affirming that his science is more correct than all the scientists in the world combined—and whether or not the cosmos has a cause is beside the point—Craig is deliberately lying about what he knows (or thinks he knows). Of course he doesn’t know better than any of the *actual bona fide scientists, cosmologists, and theoretical physicists. It’s just a bald faced WLC lie.

Now, I’m sure any WLC fan could just as easily pad their defense of Craig by saying that, perhaps, Craig really believes he does know better than most of the Earth’s scientists about something he holds no special training in, and that instead of actually telling a lie—the argument could be made—that Craig is actually delusional. Well, I admit, this is a strong possibility—but what is a delusion is not a lie we tell to ourselves?

Furthermore, Craig may believe what he does based on bad evidence, just as there are Climate change and Holocaust deniers, but in the case of the former vs. the latter, I give Craig the benefit of the doubt—because I don’t take him to be a complete moron. Which means that he’s most likely under a healthy delusion—but many religious people are. In fact, most religious people say that very exact thing about people in other religions—something Craig has done numerous times. In fact, Craig often decries atheism calling it downright absurd.

My commenter then asked:

How can you tell when someone knows the truth and tries to perpetrate a falsehood (lying), and when someone simply doesn’t care about the truth (Bullshitting)?

Well, in the case of Craig, that was fairly easy, because he explicitly admitted that he doesn’t care about the truth—since his personal faith-based convictions trump any possible truth that doesn’t conform to his “reasonable faith.” But usually we can tell someone is practicing a deliberate falsehood when they slip up, make a few mistakes, let us in on their tells, and that’s when a pattern of unreliability forms. Craig is guilty of both, since he’s claimed to know more than he possibly could and he has concocted a strange fantasy about being tuned into some sort of God-hotline via the little man living inside him, so I really don’t think it’s necessary to nitpick the details here. I could cite more examples, but that would only serve to strengthen my case.

The philosopher Matt McCormick has summed up the problem with WLC nicely:

It’s a mistake for serious philosophical atheists to devote too much time and energy to dealing with Craig because he’s a person in this field who seems to be shouting the loudest and the most.  Craig’s arguments have been dealt with at length and with devastating consequences by many people, including myself.  Craig is rarely deterred by any of these critiques, and he is not prone to acknowledge any objection or weakness no matter how clearly it has been illustrated.  But we shouldn’t mistake his pit-bull persistence and rhetorical skill in defending Christianity for something other than what it is.  The unassailability of Christianity in his mind bestows a weird kind of pointlessness to his debates.  As he and his followers see it, debates can only serve to corroborate what they already know is true—Jesus is lord.  If Craig “wins,” which he often does given his skill, then that just vindicates Christian belief once again, if he doesn’t (and few of his supporters would acknowledge that this ever happens), it doesn’t matter because he would never change his mind, and the private, magical, Holy Spirit knowledge he has in his mind makes any consideration of arguments or the evidence irrelevant.  At this point, given what he’s said about the indefeasibilty of Christian belief, I’m not inclined to take anything that Craig or his followers say seriously until I’m convinced that they are playing the same game with the same rules of rationality that the rest of us are.  An essential principle of rationality, as I see it, is that all beliefs are defeasible, and subject to the tribunal of reason. 

Next, I chose to respond to his attack on my person—mainly the allegation that what I said contained far more delusional bullshit than anything WLC has ever said. You will have to pardon me for finding that hard to believe. In fact, to the best of my knowledge, nothing I stated could even be remotely misconstrued as BS. Thus, I felt compelled to inform my commenter that he was guilty of throwing out an ad hominem, by basically calling my argument delusional bullshit, which to my dismay he actually defended.

Given your patent confusion concerning lies and Bullshit, I think that my reading was justified.

Confusion does not a bullshitter make. Indeed, we must ask ourselves, if I am unclear on something I have spent a long time thinking about, it is probably because it hasn’t been clearly relayed, or else I am missing vital information, or I am a complete moron. Either which way, that doesn’t make me “more delusional” or more of a “bullshitter” despite any misunderstandings I may have. For example, if I’m driving to a party with my wife, and we come to an intersection, and she asks me “Which way do we turn?” If I can’t remember the precise directions, I may take a guess, and say “left,” or perhaps change my mind, “No, wait, right!”

Because I have taken a blind guess, in my confusion, does not make me a bullshitter. After all, I have a 50/50 chance of being right, and more importantly, if I am wrong I can simply correct myself. Let’s not confuse the issue. God’s existence is not 50/50 odds. At least when I took a guess I was dealing with actual tangible realities—i.e., left and right exist. We know what they mean. Craig is dealing with a hypothetical. It would be strange, I feel, to accuse me of being delusional because I didn’t apply equal chances to a hypothetical without a referent in reality. I could very well inform you about all the imaginary directions I didn’t take, such as negative infinity right, instead of normal ordinary right, but that doesn’t by default mean that negative infinity right has a 50/50 chance of being correct because we all know that the needle on a compass can point East or West.

I don’t see how adding that I am a delusional bullshitter helps his case prove that Craig is not. I mean, it seems to me that this is an attack on my argument and reasoning, but it is mainly irrelevant for the reasons I just discussed. About the ad hominem remark he responded:

The ad hominem fallacy is, well, a fallacy. As such, it can only be applied to arguments. In my initial post, I didn’t make an argument, but an observation. Since observations are not arguments, they cannot be fallacious, and hence cannot be instances of the ad hominem fallacy.

Actually, if we recall, when my commenter mentioned the validity of my arguments and the soundness of my reasoning he was making an argument of sorts—he argued that my arguments and reasoning contained more delusional bullshit than anything Craig ever said. Although, what ‘delusional bullshit’ would that be exactly? That Craig lies? We’ve caught him doing just that. That he is delusional? Yes, and if you don’t believe me, just ask the little magic man living inside of him, and which speaks to him, to confirm.

In actuality, it was I who was making the observation, and since observations are not arguments, well, they cannot be fallacious. Therefore, to unjustly call my criticism of WLC “delusional bullshit” is, in point of fact, an ad hominem.

I presumed he threw out the ad hominem to imply that I was full of it, unlike Craig. I mean, one can only presume, after all. As such, I reminded him that the burden of proof is not on me to prove any of Craig’s truth claims. After all, we are specifically talking about justifying our claims. All I have done is point out that Craig’s claims are unjustified—and he is either lying to bolster his faith, or lying to convince himself the lie is actually a truth. I gave an example of each.

If Craig’s claims were supported by evidence, and panned out, then I could say—maybe there is something to this God hypothesis of his. But since that’s not the case, it’s not my burden to disprove God simply to defend my position that Craig’s God hypothesis is all BS. I mention this, precisely because nobody would claim that my argument against Craig’s position was total BS unless they already bought into Craig’s position and didn’t believe my examples (which would be hard to do considering they come right from the mouth of WLC).

So what would I be BS-ing exactly, the fact that Craig is undeniably right, and I just can’t deal with it except by calling him delusional and a liar? If so, then we better start taking Craig awfully serious when he says he knows more than all of the world’s scientists or when he claims to be in communication with the little magic man who lives inside him. If not, then I have nothing to lose by calling BS.

I have no idea whatsoever how you managed to come up with a burden of proof reference there.

Now you do. And by proxy, we should see how it is relevant. If Craig didn’t believe that God was actually real, he probably wouldn’t be bullshitting others about strange things, such as the little magic man that lives within his mind or the fact that he’s smarter than Albert Einstein, Richard Feynman, and Stephen Hawking combined. This revelation alone should cause us pause, because what it really means is that Craig isn’t willing to change his mind when his beliefs fail to hold up to scrutiny (hence the relevancy of the referenced Reasonable Faith quote) which proves just how delusional he really is.

As for my statement that Craig's positive claims are fallacy ridden, without evidence, and unverified—therefore amount to little more than BS, my commenter responded by trying to correct me, yet again (granted I may have been unclear about the connection the first time—I just figured everyone would see the obvious—but I don’t mind breaking it down—it’s all part of the fun of exposing the BS). The way I see it is the depth of Craig’s delusions directly feed into the level of the BS. Granted my commenter is right, they aren’t always mutually related, but in this instance I think it’s safe to say they are.

Again, these are not sufficient conditions of Bullshit. (They’re also demonstrably false, but again, that’s another issue).

Again, I’m going to agree that this is usually the case, but stick with my prior comment that, in this instance, the depth of the delusion is feeding the level of the BS we are hearing from Craig. How could it not? Craig believes in Christianity, and all of the strange theological beliefs which come packaged with his particular version of the faith. It would be incorrect to assume that none of this plays to his delusion, and that this conviction that his delusion is the truth does not, on occasion, compel him to tell lies about what he thinks he knows.

In fact, Craig pretends to know a lot. He knows how the universe began, he knows where morality comes from, he knows everyone who disagrees with him will go to an imaginary place called hell, he knows that everyone who thinks different is just being absurd, and he knows that he can never be proved wrong because he has the permission to deny all evidence which would serve to disprove everything he thinks he knows. I’m sorry, but this is just WLC being unreasonable on top of everything else.

I referred my commenter to read Graham Oppy's Arguing about Gods which reveals further the reasons that the majority of what Craig claims is malarkey. My reader defensively submitted:

Yet again, this is not a sufficient condition of Bullshit. If you have any specific examples in mind, I’d be interested to see them (your charges are noticeably lacking examples and support).

I gave two knock down examples, 1) a WLC lie, and 2) a WLC pile of BS. I suggested Graham Oppy’s book because it reveals the philosophical faultiness of many of the theistic arguments which Craig employs, and which would help inform the reader as to the critical method of detecting BS when happened upon.

I wasn’t arguing a conditional prerequisite for BS, I was suggesting a means of better understanding why the arguments Craig relies on to form his belief system amount to little more than fallacies mixed in with BS—just think of the fallacies as little specks of corn contained in all that BS. Yet my reader wanted an example, so here's one. 


On his website Reasonable Faith Craig takes issue with a criticism of the Kalam where a commenter said it doesn’t differentiate between monotheism and polytheism (which it technically doesn’t). Craig’s response was mind numbingly retarded:

The kalam argument is clearly not consistent with there being a group of deities cavorting with one another prior to the world’s creation, since the argument takes us back to a changeless state which is, I think, timeless. To imagine a group of timeless, unembodied minds somehow acting wholly in concert to create the world brings one awfully close to the doctrine of the Trinity. A Trinitarian (or Unitarian) concept of God seems much more plausible than polytheism’s many gods all independently existing timelessly and acting in concert to create the universe.

I hope you can see what just happened here. Craig claimed that the Kalam argument, as he knows it, is incompatible with a polytheistic outlook (although he offers no support for this claim). He immediately states that a Trinitarian view (one which believes in a Trinity) is, however, compatible. Wait a minute… what?

It makes one wonder that, what if the polytheism only consisted of three deities and no more? Still a polytheism by any other definition. Or what if the polytheism was a single entity which embodied all other deities, sort of like the Dashavatar of Vishnu in Hinduism? Sounds an awful lot like the Christian concept of the Trinity, if you ask me. Yet since there is virtually no doctrinal support for the Trinity, the very notion that Craig takes it upon himself to define what the Trinity is and isn’t compatible with is amusing.

I personally have always found the Mono-theism comprised of a Trinity to be problematic. Even if one is arguing that it’s one entity with various facets, the same could be said about other entities, such as Vishnu and the aforementioned Avatars. My only question is, how is Craig so certain that One Jehova x Jewish Son x Holy Ghost more (or less) plausible than Vishnu x Jewish Avatar x Ghostly Avatar? It all basically sounds the same to me, but that’s beside the point, because my position is that without a way to test Craig’s claims—he is literally BS-ing you.

As for other examples and support? Do I really need them? I mean, do I need to give more examples of Craig claiming he knows more than the entire scientific community at large, or that he has a magic man living in him feeding him communicates directly from the mind of God from beyond the outer limits of space and time, or that he can’t seem to tell the difference between the number 1 and the number 3? Really?

Personally, I think that would be a better use of a theologians time. But like Thomas Paine, I believe that theology is essentially the study of nothing, so I’m not going to waste my time poking holes in Craig’s theological considerations any more than necessary to get the point across. Natural theology, as far as I’m concerned, is exactly like my fellow SCEPTIC Mike D. states:

“Natural theology overestimates the value of our intuitions, which are often mistaken, but it commits its greatest folly simply by erroneously presuming that our understanding of metaphysics can be used to make inferences about the supernatural…. Since the supernatural, by definition, is not bound by our metaphysical rules, we can't assume that things that hold true for us – intuitive or not – hold true beyond us.”

In the meantime, however, we should all feel free to call William Lane Craig on his BS—and point out when he’s talking nonsense or else fabricating entire fantasies and passing them off as universal truths.

Tuesday, February 15, 2011

Entropy Kills Kalam! Boom Shaka Laka!


The Argument from Entropy
Initially I conceived the argument from entropy as a contra-argument to the Kalam cosmological argument. Also, logically speaking the argument from entropy is backed by real observation, and is based on the second law of thermodynamics, hence the argument from entropy. But what is it exactly? The argument from entropy is:

1.     God created everything (including life)
2.     Entropy is certain
3.     Entropy will extinguish all life
4.     God has the power to prevent entropy, but doesn’t
5.     A God of love would prevent entropy
6.     Therefore God cannot be a loving being

Here we see that, logically speaking, entropy rules out a loving creator God. Even so, it is true that some deity may still be responsible for having created a universe capable of supporting life, but only insofar as this fulfills his ultimate purpose to, subsequently, have it annihilated (via entropy). As such, this rules out the Christian God, since we know that the Christian God is all loving and has the power to prevent certain death of his beloved creation. Failing to do so would suggest that it is not a loving God who created the universe; should a supernatural creating agent be involved. Thus the creator of this universe cannot be the Christian God.

Kalam Assumes Wrongly
Proponents of the Kalam cosmological argument assume that God is a personal being, a being of immense love, who intended there to be the flourishing of life—not impending heat death. But low and behold, the second law of thermodynamics is a veritable fact! As plain as day, we can see that any life which arises will just as quickly be snuffed out of existence, and this regrettable fact is evidence that God’s real desire is to have all things in existence annihilated. This means God is capriciously creating life only to distinguish it. It also means he is not technically a creator being, but rather, a being of destruction. Since the argument from entropy is predicated on real observations, and Kalam is predicated on the assumption of an uncaused cause (which we’ll get to momentarily), we know that the argument from entropy overrules the Kalam cosmological argument.

The Cornucopia Conundrum
Another reason the argument from entropy overrides the Kalam cosmological argument is that it is more practical. Unlike the Kalam, it does not generate the problem of inestimable quantities of excess gods. A Christian detractor criticized the argument from entropy, stating:

I am not sure how your ‘entropy argument’ defeats Kalam. Kalam makes no claim about the nature of the goodness of God or the permanence of the universe, per se, so claiming that somehow entropy indicates God isn’t what Christians suppose Him to be is irrelevant in this case... and I am not sure what it has to do with Kalam at all.

Okay, let’s break it down. The entire premise of Kalam, and the cosmological argument in general, rests on the theological foundation of Christianity as a proof for the existence of God. While is need not refer to the Christian God specifically, as it does not presuppose monotheism, it is most frequently employed by Christian theologians.

The prior assumption that the Creator being is the God of Christianity denotes a distinction between the types of gods we may be speaking of. Other religions have other concepts, but we cannot divorce the theological basis of the Kalam without losing all referent to the sort of deity it is trying to prove. After all, many gods are supposedly capable of creating the universe, but somehow I doubt the Kalam cosmological argument is making the claim that Brahma is the creator of the cosmic waters (i.e., the universe), in which he deposited the seed of life, in the form of a golden egg, called the hiranyagarbha, in which it was born itself as Brahma, the creator of the universe.

However, Christians presumptively claim that their God concept is the only viable one, i.e. the one true God. This is an inlaid confirmation bias, a feature of Christian thought, which, as it so happens, conveniently gets rid of the problem of having to weed through excess gods. Such an expedient fix may ease the believer’s difficulty in having to take seriously other religion’s god concepts, while escaping the heavy burden of weeding through and endless series of excess gods, testing god hypothesis after god hypothesis, to find the correct one predicted by Kalam.

If Kalam merely intended to prove that a god (singular, lowercase deity), then without defining it as, quote unquote, “the Christian God,” any other god would do. Therefore the confirmation bias within Christianity acts as a filter which allows only one god concept to properly be considered. As such, this confirmation bias is the reason the Kalam cosmological argument only intends to prove the existence of just one god—the Christian God—even as the Kalam cosmological argument does not presuppose monotheism.[i]

Knowing this we can safely assume that the Kalam cosmological argument, as argued for by Christian theologians, does make specific claims about the nature of the goodness of God and the permanence of the universe, because such claims are married to Christian theology and, as we have seen, cannot be so easily divorced. 

Foundations of the Kalam Cosmological Argument
Knowing that the Kalam cosmological argument does, in fact, refer to the Christian God, as Christian theologian William Lane Craig maintains, we can make some simple deductions based on the provided context. Let’s simplify this into formal logic and see how it works out.

According to Christian Belief
1.     God exists
2.     God is a creator being
3.     Everything in existence was created
4.     Therefore God created all

Following modal logic, we know that since God created everything he must be the initial cause of creation. Theologians then semantically manipulate the language by saying God is the “uncaused cause” which created the universe. Basically, saying something is an “uncaused cause” is the same as saying that it “just is.” How can we hope to argue against something that “just is”? Checkmate skeptics! God just is, deal with it. Never mind that this is nothing more than unconfirmed, desperate, special pleading.

Yet the Kalam cosmological argument goes one step further than this and suggests that God transcends all physical reality. What this means is that he is beyond space and time, he literally transcends reality. Which is sort of like saying God exists outside of the theoretical framework, and this is clearly meant to safeguard God from disproof. Now, according to Christian theological reasoning, God just is and since this is an unfalisfiable claim, we can neither confirm or disconfirm it, and so must take it on faith. Religious people tend to like unfalsifiable premises because they are a lot like Invisible Pink Unicorns. So be weary of such obvious pitfalls. Side-step them and move on.

Before we come back to the argument from entropy, however, let’s better define God as to discover why his inborn nature denotes that he act as creating agent.

According to Christian Belief
1.     God is a loving being
2.     God’s will is for there to be life
3.     God created all life (from 2)
4.     Therefore God love’s all life (from 1 and 3)

This defines God’s character, according to Christian belief, that he is a creator, is a loving God, and so, as a consequence, loves his creation infinitely. Allowing for the Christian understanding paves the way for the Kalam cosmological argument.

Two Logical Inferences from the Argument from Entropy
Now let’s talk about why the argument from entropy is problematic for the Kalam cosmological argument.

Let us consider two options regarding the consequences that arise from the argument from entropy.

Option 1
It is likely that the universe we live in is the byproduct of a capricious and unloving supreme being in which we are merely anomalous life forms, accidents of an ill-fated universe predestined to annihilation.

Implication
If so, for me personally, this is a frightening prospect and one religious believers ought to seriously ponder. Does such a description, as the argument from entropy provides, derived from observable reality, fit with the Christian notion of God? If not, then they are mistaken about the nature of their God. Whereas evil god theory accounts for the second law of thermodynamics, the Christian concept of God does not. In fact, the Christian concept of God, as we saw above, is falsified by the argument from entropy.

Option 2
It is likely that the universe exists as it naturally is, minus supernatural agents/assumptions, and therefore the observed entropy simply reflects the sort of universe we happen to live in.

Implication
If so, tough luck, but I still find it more desirable than being made a pawn in some mad-as-a-march-hair deity’s rigged chess game. Option two contains the more plausible answer, since unlike the philosophical premise of the first one, no ad hoc assumptions about initial causes are being made. Applying Occam’s razor we see the supernatural premise of a creating agent is unnecessary to explain entropy, therefore the second option is the more feasible of the two.

Asking the questions, “what sort of universe do we live in” and “which option most accurately depicts it?” allows us to rephrase these options as a logical deduction. It goes something like this: Using Occam’s razor to cut out the extemporaneous, option one falls away, since all supernatural agents/assumptions are unnecessary. Heat entropy can be explained as a natural consequence of the sort of universe we live in without invoking prior supernatural causes. Thus option two becomes the more conceivable choice. Accordingly, the best logical inference is that God is not required for the sort of universe we find ourselves in, and more over, the God of Christianity is incompatible with the sort of universe we do find ourselves in. As such, we can safely assume the Christian God does not exist.

Now, you can check my reasoning and see if I have made some sort of oversight, but I have thought long and hard about this, I have double and triple checked the logic, and I simply do not see what I could have overlooked.


About Beginnings
For Kalam to work God must exist necessarily so that he may be established as an uncaused cause, but I would caution this is pure sophist speculation. It does not follow from any logical deduction that I am aware of. Christians often presume we lack evidence of things coming into existence absent of any known cause. Anything which came into existence without a cause would defeat the idea that the universe could only come into existence via God’s divine will. Meaning, that if there was any evidence which showed us that the universe may come into existence without the aid of God, well then, this would defeat the Kalam cosmological argument. Luckily we are in possession of such evidence.

Quantum mechanics has measured the energy patterns of a proton coming in and out of existence with no apparent cause.

If the universe is uncaused, and just is, but exists none-the-less, then we have no need to ask about the cause. Kalam then posits God is the cause—which we have absolutely no reason to invoke. If the universe spontaneously came into existence, as quantum mechanics suggests, then again, we have no valid reason to invoke God.

The Circle that Begot a Triangle: Expounding the Analogy
According to Kalam: God is an uncaused cause; the universe is caused; therefore God preceded the universe and therefore must have caused it. That’s the reasoning behind Kalam anyway.

According to my analogy: A circle which is uncaused just is; a triangle is caused; therefore the circle which preceded the triangle must have caused it. Notice there is no actual link between a circle which just is and the existence of the triangle.

Thus asking whether an uncaused cause is related to the beginning of what it purportedly caused is ineffective. There is no valid relationship to connect God (the uncaused cause which just is) to the universe’s existence any more so than there is an uncaused circle (which just is) denotes any relationship to the existence of a triangle.

The theological premise that an uncaused cause caused our universe, and that God is such an uncaused causer, is not merely illogical, but hubristic in the highest sense of the word. It would be like saying that an uncaused circle caused a triangle, therefore any triangle which exists must have had a beginning, therefore a cause, thus the circle (which just is) really exists. Thinking this way too long is bound to give you a headache.

Worse still, somehow the nature of the triangle, it having three distinct angles, sides of discernible length, etc., is proof the circle (which just is) also happens to be loving circle of all triangular beginnings, for he loved them enough to give the unique properties which define triangles (three acute angles connected by three line segments—just as theologians claim God’s love also sponsored his desire to create life and therefore the life sustaining properties unique to our universe are evidence of God). Seriously, this is how backwards the reasoning of the Kalam cosmological argument is.

Recall that when we restate the Kalam’s first premise, to reflect our more practical understanding of the observable universe, we come up with: all physical reality which exists has a beginning and most probably a cause. As a lucky side-effect, all the other cause claims fall away, but the meaning is retained. Things that begin to exist usually have causes. But this does nothing to suggest God is that cause. For all we know, there may not have been any cause, i.e. the universe may have spontaneously erupted out of Quantum fluctuations, called a Quantum singularity. Let’s not overlook the fact that it’s called a singularity for a reason.

Therefore invoking God as an uncaused cause, proves illogical to begin with, and has nothing to do with the existence of the universe. Positing an uncaused cause as the cause to our beginning, then, is simply superfluous and is not necessary in establishing the universe’s existence. Do Quantum fluctuations require the existence of God? How so? That’s what I’d like to know. Couldn’t quantum events themselves be considered uncaused causes? Then what purpose serves God? God causing the universe simply does not follow from logical deduction, and so is, in philosophical terms, a poor inference. Just as an uncased circle is a poor inference for the existence of a triangle.

The Bottom Line
I do realize that the Kalam is arguing for the existence of God, not the existence of the universe, or of imaginary circles. But when pondering philosophical subjects, such as these, it is important to keep a distinction between analogies which aid in the description of the concept, and the concept itself. I think people often confuse or conflated the two. Analogies aren’t exact, mind you, they’re analogous.

The bottom line is God’s existence does not necessarily follow from logical processes. We cannot get from uncaused circles to triangles any more so than we can get from God to the universe. This is why the Kalam is a non-sequitur. It hasn’t proved God, nor has it explained the origins of the universe (to any relatable degree), even as it pretends to do both.

When we consider entropy, matters get severely complicated. As I have shown, the sort of universe we live in where the second law of thermodynamics is a veritable fact leads us to conclude that should God have created such a universe, he is either evil (a fact which is completely incompatible with the Christian God), or else, more probably, he does not exist as entropy can be explained without invoking supernatural agents (the simpler solution).



[i] The Kalam cosmological argument does not presuppose monotheism, let alone a personal God. Instead it allows for various conceptualizations of god. I’ve written about this problem before in my essay entitled “The Problem with Kalam” (see here). Christian confirmation bias, however, is the only thing requiring Kalam be about the God of Christianity.

Friday, February 11, 2011

Why the Kalam Cosmological Argument is a Non Sequitur


Uncaused Causes Can't Cause Themselves, You Know? What the F*@k?!
I am specifically going to address the classical version of the argument, since the modern version (involving time concepts such as the infinite) lacks an up-to-date understanding of basic physics and cosmology which sort of renders the entire argument moot in the first place. Therefore I won't waste mine, your's, or anybody else's time taking a part a non-argument.

A review of the Kalam Cosmological Argument (classical version): 

The Kalam Cosmological Argument:
  1. Everything that has a beginning of its existence has a cause of its existence.
  2. The universe has a beginning of its existence.
  3. Thus the universe has a cause of its existence.
  4. This first uncaused cause must transcend physical reality.
  5. This uncaused cause that transcends physical reality is the description of God.
  6. Therefore God exists.
1) Mmmm... yeah. So everything has a beginning. This is, believe it or not, an untrue philosophical statement. Philosophically speaking, endings typically don't have beginnings. Now don't get me wrong, a play, a movie, a song on the radio begins and ends, but so far as we know, endings in themselves do not have beginnings. The circumference of a circle doesn't have a beginning or end. I should clarify, don't get confused, the creation of the circle (whatever cause should precede it) is merely the initiation of its existence. If you ask me however, if we have an uncaused circle, asking about the cause is illogical.

An uncaused cause, by its very nature, just is. So a circle which just is, then, may or may not have a cause for its existence. The question is sort of useless. It's like asking whether or not the concept of infinity has a beginning or end. Um, yes and no, to both. To rephrase number one, the wording would be better stated as: all physical reality which exists has a beginning and most probably a cause.

2) The second point, that the universe has a beginning is correct in that our universe exists and so it, as far as we know, must have had some kind of a beginning. The Big Bang is the going theory, but some researchers suggest that the universe may have had a series of near infinite beginnings (i.e., cyclic universe theory). So it would be more correct to assume that our understanding is merely provisional, thus the universe (as it currently is) most likely had a beginning (but the verdict is still out as to the exact nature to this beginning). At any rate, this merely affirms the statement that things which exist in reality must have had some kind of beginning, which simply becomes a redundancy when you account for the better rephrase of number one. Thus number two falls away.

3) Number three starts to get "philosophical" again, since any cause worth mentioning is, at this time, purely speculative. Logically, assuming causality fits with what we know and can observe, but really, it's just a non sequitur. It's basically claiming things which exist must therefore have been made to exist. But again, this too falls away when number one is properly restated.

4) As for number four, the first uncaused cause transcending reality, this is pure gibberish. First of all, we don't know what "causes" were involved in the creation of this particular incarnation of the universe. Of the variety of universes which could have been "caused" (even speculatively speaking) it seems that one which is capable of sustaining life is just as good as any other. What transcending reality has to do with things beyond initial causes is beyond me.

My point is, we cannot assume that the first cause, or quantum event, was uncaused. Quantum mechanics suggest quantum fluctuations are naturally ongoing, i.e., no cause, no beginning, no ending. It just is. Does this mean that Quantum flux transcends reality? Not exactly. After all, we can measure it. So number four, it would seem, is simply incoherent gibberish.

5) Onto number five! So although number four is pure gibberish, somehow this suddenly turns into the descriptive referent for God. The uncaused cause is God! Why? Because God transcends reality! Well, that's just a special pleading. How do we get from an uncaused cause (which as I have stated is purely speculative) to God? Which god? Idealistically, your God? Quaint. But ultimately, this means number five is a non sequitur.

6) Number six, the conclusion, affirms God exists. But this doesn't follow. After all, the only statement we have is that things which exist in physical reality most probably have a cause. At best, it's more special pleading. So let's recap:

The Kalam Cosmological Argument:
  1. Unfounded speculation.
  2. Probable but unconfirmed theory.
  3. Philosophical speculation.
  4. Sophist gibberish.
  5. Non sequitur.
  6. Special pleading, based on a faulty premise, and is likely a wrong conclusion.

Nothing to it. Literally. The Kalam Cosmological argument literally reduces down to speculation, gibberish, non sequiturs, and special pleading.

Hidden Theological Dimensions
Now, there's an implication behind the Christian theology, one which may not be obvious in the secular language of the formal style being used. This implication is that God (e.g., the God of Christianity) is a creator God, and therefore his "intention" (translated by theologians as "God's will") was to create the universe.

William Lane Craig often suggests this theological tidbit is the reason for why God would have initially chosen to "cause" the universe in the first place. Yet this assumes too much. We do not know what "caused" the universe or if it even had a cause. Furthermore, we know entropy (i.e., the second law of thermodynamics) is a veritable fact.

Three things arise from this observation, none of them good for the Kalam Cosmological argument or for Christian theology. They are as follows:

Argument from Entropy
1. a) Entropy suggests God's intention is not to create life but to destroy it. b) The evidence of this exists with his "entropical" nature, from the prior.

2. Any life which should arise is merely an unfortunate side-effect of God's desire to have things annihilated (from 1), since in order to destroy something you first must have something.

3. Knowing that, contrary to what Christians believe, God actually desires to have everything destroyed (from 2) for no good reason, we therefore know that he is a being of chaos and destruction, void of love, and is downright contestable.

Interestingly enough, in an unforseen twist of fate, the argument from entropy not only proves God is not a creator being but a being of pure destruction, it also proves God, who has the power to prevent entropy but does not, would rather see death than life--and therefore could only be considered an evil being.

Two Conclusions
If we take away any to things from this lesson, it is this: 1) The Kalam Cosmological Argument is a non sequitur. 2) The argument from entropy proves God is an evil being bent on the annihilation of all life in the entire universe.

Wednesday, September 29, 2010

The Problem With Kalam




The Problem With Kalam

Kalam, or more formally the Kalam cosmological argument as presented by the Christian theologian William Lane Craig states:

1.     The Cosmological Argument from Contingency

The cosmological argument comes in a variety of forms. Here’s a simple version of the famous version from contingency:

1.  Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.
2.  If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.
3.  The universe exists.
4.  Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence (from 1, 3).
5.  Therefore, the explanation of the universe’s existence is God (from 2, 4).

Now this is a logically airtight argument. That is to say, if the premises are true, then the conclusion is unavoidable. It doesn’t matter if we don’t like the conclusion. It doesn’t matter if we have other objections to God’s existence. So long as we grant the three premises, we have to accept the conclusion. So the question is this: Which is more plausible—that those premises are true or that they are false?

Herein lies the problem. The Kalam cosmological argument does not presuppose monotheism. In other words, there isn’t anything to suggest that it wasn’t a pantheon of minds/deities/gods which created the universe instead of just one. Why is this a problem? Consider the following logical argument:

1.      The inference that there was only one creating agent is true
2.      The inference that there was more than one creating agent is true
3.      Both can’t be simultaneously true
4.      Therefore, if 1 is true then 2 is false and if 2 is true then 1 is false
5.      Unable to defer to either 1 or 2 the possibility of neither/none

Therefore there is no direct corollary between the inference of any creating agent(s) and the causality of the universe. What does this mean? It means, that like a team of computer programmers toiling away to design a complex computer program, the universe could very well have been designed and brought into existence by an assembly of advanced thinking beings/deities. Furthermore there is no way to deduce whether it was one or a thousand gods who assumedly did the toiling. But since it can’t be both, and both are equally plausible and therefore equally unlikely, neither option can be justified by inference alone, thus none becomes the more likely option—leaving us right back where we started—at ground zero. Therefore the Kalam cosmological argument fails.

Possible Objections and Counter Objections
Actually, I don't think people discuss the personal/necessary being aspect of Craig's argument enough. Personally, I find this is where the chinks in the armor are. Many causes is a huge obstacle for Craig, which is why he keeps ducking the challenge of tackling it head on. Craig's response to this objection on his website Reasonable Faith is utterly lame. According to Craig:

The kalam argument is clearly not consistent with there being a group of deities cavorting with one another prior to the world’s creation, since the argument takes us back to a changeless state which is, I think, timeless. To imagine a group of timeless, unembodied minds somehow acting wholly in concert to create the world brings one awfully close to the doctrine of the Trinity. A Trinitarian (or Unitarian) concept of God seems much more plausible than polytheism’s many gods all independently existing timelessly and acting in concert to create the universe.

Craig might want to occasionally pause and think about what he is saying. As it is, he contradicts himself in the same sentence. First he says a group of deities (with multiple minds) is inconsistent with the Kalam cosmological argument and then reneges the statement immediately afterward to claim a triune deity (with multiple minds) works just fine. What is a trinity if not a group of three? Even if it is one Transcendent personal being, there are at least three distinct personalities/minds. Craig contradicts himself. Three is not one.

Craig still needs to provide a method which allows him to differentiate between one and the many, otherwise he's up the creek without a paddle. Maybe because he believes the Trinity to be one whole entity it's not three separate minds so much as a schizophrenic schism of personality types? How does he figure? He doesn't, he just expects you to agree with him--more special pleading. Likewise what is to differentiate between a necessary deity, existing in a changeless state, and two or more causal agents doing the same? Time is only an added dimension, and is relative, so has nothing to do with how many causes (or causal agents) there can ultimately be (in Transcendent form). 

Also, why can't a pantheon also act as a hive mind? The Borg in Star Trek the Next Generation can do it. I think Craig reveals the limits of his own imagination when he fails to consider such an obvious analogy. Now just make the Borg Transcendent beings, and presto! Craig thinks, for some odd reason, that a pantheon of gods working is concert is harder to grasp than one schizophrenic God. I don't see how a pantheon of, say, three polytheistic gods is harder to grasp than, oh well, a Triune being which is three in one. If you ask me, the concept of three in one is rather convoluted.

Craig simply dismisses the objection as if he's never really thought it through, which is why I have a hard time taking him seriously. He wants people to agree with him, but until he explains how Kalam predicts one necessary causal agent, which so happens to be a complex personal creator being with a schizophrenic personality, I think the objection of many causes is more than valid--it's completely devastating to Craig's entire argument.

Some other objections which might be raised include:

1.      Applying Occam’s razor we find that one god, or a God, is the simplest “explanation” and so has a better chance of being the correct inference. 

a.      Although Occam’s razor is a useful rule of thumb in weeding out unnecessary information, there is nothing the the Kalam cosmological argument which suggests a strict law of parsimony need be observed. Therefore my initial point that multiple gods are just as likely as an inference as one god stand as the primary objection to the validity of the Kalam cosmological argument. Additionally, what’s to suggest a conscious mind of a thinking god is less complex than a quantum event? Indeed, the rule of parsimony cannot be relied upon here. 

2.      Other cosmological evidence, such as fine-tuning and the argument of something rather than nothing, suggest an intentional set of laws which in turn denote a conscious act behind the intentionality of the predetermined parameters. 

a.      Again, there is nothing which presupposes monotheism, even as fine-tuning remains, in my opinion, the best chance of establishing a practical cosmological argument, it doesn’t go far enough to address the initial problem of many gods vs. one god, and so leaves us right back where we started. 

3.      The argument from reason seems to hint at the fact that our own consciousness is a necessary consequence of the detectable intentionality of a greater consciousness. 

a.      Even if we grant this, we cannot forget to overlook the fact that neuroscience offers a good preliminary model for human consciousness. Moreover, if granted, there is still no reason to assume a single consciousness over multiple or plural consciousnesses. What is to suggest that I don’t derive my consciousness from god X while you derive yours from god Y? Still the problem of aggregation remains.

I would predict any other objections will meet the same trouble, therefore my initial point that Kalam doesn’t presuppose monotheism remains valid. As such it still follows that there is no direct corollary between the inference of any creating agent(s) and the causality of the universe.

Identifying Weak Propositions
Whenever people argue over the deductive powers of the Kalam cosmological argument, or any other cosmological argument for that matter, I get confounded. By my reckoning there is no valid reason to even consider the argument or its deductions to begin with. The Kalam cosmological argument as offered by Craig and every other cosmological argument each fail in the same fashion.

Even if we assume the Kalam cosmological argument is true, at best it could only be an inference for a deistic creating agent, but not any specific type of god (personal or otherwise). If the theologian presupposes their version of God then they have simply taken out a qualification they needed to prove their case and are begging the question. Knowing this to be the case, any suggestion that the Kalam cosmological argument is a legitimate inference for God (because the universe exists, therefore must have been caused, thus proves that God is necessary to establish such causality) is simply special pleading.

In truth, however, hinging one’s entire proof for God on two faulty premises is by any epistemic standard a failed argument. Yet what theologian would be willing to admit that they are mistaken? Since such an admission would defeat their purpose of proving the existence of God and offering the argument in the first place they adamantly search for novel ways to keep believing in the validity of an illegitimate argument. Theologians like Craig love to flog a dead horse, hoping that your curiosity will be peaked by the bizarre and strange event long enough to compel you to come over to inquire what he’s on about. This gives the theologian the chance they need to urge you into buying their snake’s oil and have you listen to what they have to say and why they feel it is a valid argument—one that you couldn’t possibly refuse. They’ll likely throw in some ‘eternal salvation’ for free if you hurry up and buy now.

Conclusion
All considered, we find that the Kalam cosmological argument fails to establish any genuine inference that the universe was caused by a creator being whatsoever, and for that reason it is invalid. Simply put, the Kalam cosmological argument fails before it ever begins, and if you ask me that’s a telltale sign of a non-argument. If theologians were more honest with themselves they would reject the Kalam cosmological argument altogether, and without hesitation, on the basis that it is by all accounts something which simply cannot be true by inference alone. Of course, then they would not be able to say that the existence of the universe points to the existence of a divine ‘creator’ being. Well, too bad. I suggest we deal with it and move on.

THREE REASONS I.C.E SHOULDN’T EXIST (The Aftermath of Renee Good's Killing)

“Political language is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.” ― G...