Showing posts with label intelligent design. Show all posts
Showing posts with label intelligent design. Show all posts

Monday, January 16, 2012

Is Fine-Tuning Evidence for God? A thought Experiment



Proponents of Intelligent Design (Creationism) often argue that fine tuning, which is a rather inaccurate term for the physical constants of the universe, must have been finely tuned by a "designer" and therefore denote a higher intelligence, or in their minds, [G]od.


But to jump from physical constants to an intelligent creator being (of some sort) is a logic leap which betrays a failure in their line of reasoning. Let me explain by way of a thought experiment.


Let me give three sets of random numbers. Now, for the sake of argument, let's assume that each of these numbers represent the physical constants of three separate universes. Fair enough? Good.


Universe A  568723410048009


Universe B  334223112556778


Universe C  111111111111111


My question is this, which universe is the so called "finely tuned" universe?


You see, fine-tuning isn't something which happens to the universe. The physical constants just are--as such discovering the physical constants is merely an observation which doesn't preclude the conscious act of design. The numbers are just what they are. The fact that we can discover these physical constants and measure them means that whichever set of numbers we observe just happens to be right for life to exist.


In my thought experiment above--all three examples are right for life, because no matter which physical constant you are looking at, the fact that you can observe it means that it allows for the right conditions for life, like you, to evolve.


Yet all of these physical constants were just randomly generated. Not by me, but by an unthinking computer. So there was no sense of "tuning" these numbers to fit my expectations or desires for there to be life. They just popped out of thin air.


Suffice to say, IDers are wrong to assume that fine-tuning is evidence for God, or any transcendent intelligence of any kind. Fine-tuning is not (I repeat... not) evidence for God. The physical constants of the universe are just sets of numbers based on what we measure and observe. We just so happen to inhabit a universe with a set of physical constants which allows for the sustainable existence of life (which is why we can observe it in the first place). It's that simple.







Thursday, November 24, 2011

Quote of the Day: G.W. Foote on Evolution vs. Intelligent Design

"Evolution shows that the design argument puts the cart before the horse. Natural Selection, as Dr. Schmidt appositely remarks, accounts for adaptation as a result without requiring the supposition of design as a cause. And if you cannot deduce God from the animate world, you are not likely to deduce him from the inanimate." --G.W. Foote (Dean Stanley's Latest, August 1881)

Monday, July 4, 2011

Why Intelligent Design is Not Intelligent


Why Intelligent Design is Not Intelligent

[N]othing we currently know from our best sources of knowledge requires anyone to buy into one or more of the many extravagant claims that are made by those who would try to use science to promote their own particular mystical or supernatural worldview. Since these promoters introduce extraneous elements of reality not required by the data, their proposals fail the test of parsimony. It then follows that they have the burden of proving their schemes, not I the burden of disproving them.
--Victor J. Stenger (Timeless Reality)

               Mike D. over at The A-Unicornist wrote a good article questioning what it is we mean by design when we talk about something being designed and goes on to criticize, rightly so, those who misuse the term “design” when they talk about “intelligent design.” Feeling inspired by his post, I thought I would add a few of my own thoughts to the subject of design, and why, ultimately, intelligent design is not so intelligent after all.
               In this essay I am going to talk about the various reasons why Intelligent Design, as proposed by religious believers, is not just wrong, but largely incoherent. I will attempt to show, that, in reality, the universe has no discernible design. As such, unable to detect any specific features which would denote an intentional design, we cannot infer purpose. If there is no design or underlying purpose, then the universe is uncaused (*supernaturally speaking--it may yet prove to have a natural cause we don't yet know of), and therefore there is no such thing as an “intelligent designer.”

Tuesday, February 8, 2011

Utility of the God Hypothesis = Zilch




Ring-a-ring O' Roses with a Push Me Pull You-And We All Fall Down
It's just common sense that the preconceived notion that God exists is not evidence for saying that God conclusively exists. This also applies for non-mutual claims, such as, the existence of the universe does not beget the existence of God. These are independent claims. They may or may not be related, but any such inference is purely speculative since there is absolutely nothing to suggest one necessitates the other.

Let's consider the fine tuning argument, for example. When a Christian theologian pretends that God is the creator of the entire universe, that this God is omnipotent and omniscient, etc. (e.g., the Biblical God of Christianity) and that he has set the parameters for life to arise, and thus this "fine tuning" is evidence for an “intelligent designer,” and therefore the appearance of our universe’s finely tuned properties are, in turn, evidence for the existence of a creator God, this is faulty reasoning. 

How so? Because it starts with the ad hoc assumption that God exists, and then it posits the finely tuned properties of our universe as evidence for God's existence, then in post hoc fashion the theory is augmented to account for God’s intentions of why he created the universe capable of supporting life. In other words, it’s a belief in search of evidence rather than evidence relied upon as the basis for developing a set of provisional beliefs based on that evidence.

For even if there turns out to be a creator God, then how does the universe’s properties which come out of nature’s physical laws denote any semblance of design let alone intention of a designer? Simply put, if we did not live in a universe capable of supporting life we would not know about it-the fact that our universe is observer dependent does not require that it be specifically designed for us to observe. It just happens to be dialed into the right set of parameters for life to evolve so that observation can be made. I for one do not see how a range of numbers denotes intent. Personally, I feel this is the religious projecting their own desire for God to be real onto the data.

See, the problem here is that we have to allow the assumption that the natural physical laws of the universe could only come about by being “tuned” by a “tinkerer” being, but this assumption is invalid since, as any levelheaded cosmologist would tell you, regardless of whether or not certain physical properties are necessary for the formulation of life, that this does not automatically entail, or require, an “intelligence” to bring such parameters into harmony. In fact, most cosmologists will probably explain that these parameters are simply consequences which fall out of the preexisting natural laws, and can be explained naturally with no need to invoke any supernatural agents of any kind. Thus there is no reason to posit an “intelligent designer.”

Although, I’m quite aware that deriving the fundamental properties of the universe from natural laws doesn’t rule out an intelligent designer either. However, since it is neither here nor there, sort of like Dr. Doolittle's fabulous Push Me Pull You, the so called “fine tuning” of our universe’s physical properties cannot be used for evidence for God. The inference is without support.

Instead of doing as scientists do, reviewing the information accumulated by experiment and observation and formulating a theory, theists are stating their conclusion and then informing that the evidence fits with their theory about God’s existence. Usually this takes the form of the Cosmological argument: because the universe exists, then it must have been created, therefore it has a creator, and this is evidence for God. Basically, theists are arguing from an unsupported belief to the evidence instead of relying on the evidence as support when formulating a plausible set of beliefs.  


Superimposing Intent on Unintentional Causes
As I stated earlier, the Cosmological argument goes from its conclusion to its premise in support of its conclusion, which is the same as saying it's ridiculously circular. God exists-the universe exists-thus God must have made the universe-therefore proof of God. Yet this argument is predicated on the argument from ignorance (a fallacy best to be avoided).

The correct reasoning would look like this: The universe exists, we do not yet know how it came to be, but since it exists it is may be probable that it was created. However, that’s where the hypothesis, and so too conclusion, ends. It never goes as far as to claim the existence of a supernatural creating agent (especially since we know there are natural causes, such as fecund universes or multiverses, which are more probable than any supernatural cause. Note: multiverses are predicted in numerous different branches of cosmology, and therefore are highly likely. See Brian Greene's The Hidden Reality, chapter 2 and 3). 

Those who like to say God is the creating agent, and the initial cause of the universe, are taking a Kierkegaardian leap of faith and assuming that whatever creating agent is the cause for the universe it must be God (or more accurately their concept of God). The truth is, we just simply do not know what happened before the quantum singularity (i.e., the big bang).

Thus we know the God hypothesis continues to lack all the credentials to qualify as a working theory, and moreover, it fails to make any valid predictions which can be confirmed and that, conveniently enough, cannot be falsified.

Even if we were to give believers the benefit of the doubt, and agree with them (for argument’s sake) that God was real, then it would call for more stringent testing of their hypothesis. For example, we may ask, how exactly do the “finely tuned” parameters of our universe fall out of God’s being? If believers fail to answer this question satisfactorily then they have failed to supply reason why God should be the cause of the fine tuning in the first place.

Theologians often duck the issue by affirming God is, by his own nature, a “creator” being and so it is his “intention” that the “fine tuning” be within the required parameters for the universe to support life. But several erroneous assumptions crop up. Obviously, the first is that God is a “creator” being of some kind. Although it would seem such a claim is biblically supported, there is no extrabiblical (i.e., practical) evidence to substantiate such a claim. For all we know God could be a “destroyer” being and, to use the theologian’s logic, entropy proves his “entropical” nature. Thus God's intention may not be to create, but rather, be only to destroy (creation of the universe, and of life, would only be the prerequisite necessary for destruction to take place).

Also, we know that, should God prove to be a real entity, and should God be omniscient and omnipotent, that we would require a lot more substantive evidence than an archaic fragment of a dilapidated piece of papyrus written over three thousand years ago to prove whether or not this being, in point of fact, intended there to be life at all. Especially, as we have seen, he could equally be considered a being of destruction. So the assumption that God “intended” there to be life is merely that, a baseless assumption. Creation doctrine is simply without merit-especially since it begins with God creating everything, which sounds all honky dory, that is, until up pops a talking snake in a magical garden with a magical tree with magical fruit, and then you're clued into the fact that it's (actually) an origin myth and has nothing to do with what God's intentions might actually be should he really exist.  


An Obsolete Time Piece
Needless to say, we already have reliable theories derived from the natural laws, such as Einstein’s theory of general relativity and quantum mechanics which, in turn, explain things like galaxy, nebula, and star formation—as well as planet orbits and the orbits of extraterrestrial bodies such as asteroids, meteors, and moons—as well as things like the electromagnetic properties (e.g., charge) of an electron and so on—we have no reason to posit a “God hypothesis” in lieu of already perfectly dependable theories which fit (with exacting precision) current data and observation.

At this juncture, it seems the God hypothesis is simply superfluous and so not particularly needed. This is the polite way of saying there is no model of nature which requires the God hypothesis, and more over, there is no inference to be had from nature which would necessitate the belief in the first place. Indeed, it serves no discernible purpose other than to act as a means to interject a “profession of faith” into a field of practice (e.g., science) where faith is not required and serves no purpose to the enhancement of our understanding of the universe. Furthermore, metaphysical naturalism is a more plausible option for explaining real world phenomenon, since it is backed by the success of methodological naturalism.

It is my opinion that the God hypothesis should be discarded and viewed as nothing more than pure, unfounded, speculation. Even so, where answers are unavailable and mysteries remain in excess, this is not (by any logical deduction) evidence for God (e.g., the God of the gaps argument is just tenuous excuse making set about to salvage belief in God—but again serves no purpose other than to sustain a diminishing faith). Just because science cannot say, for example, exactly how the universe came about does not mean the belief in God is a good substitute for methodological naturalism, which thus far has an impeccable track record. Meanwhile, it appears the God hypothesis has zero utility, and thus does not count for much, least of all a feasible theory.

Why the God Hypothesis Fails 
Rationalists and realists of a naturalistic inclination will tell you that the God hypothesis fails miserably for a couple reasons. First, it lacks basic support, empirically tested evidence, and confirmed results which would substantiate the claims that the existence of a personal God is anything other than an unfounded belief. Next, and perhaps just as pertinent, is the fact that the God hypothesis lacks the fundamental utility required to make successful predictions, enhance our knowledge, or improve our understanding of the natural world.

Whereas the first requisite renders the God hypothesis untenable due to insufficient evidence, lending itself instead to healthy skepticism, the second feature of utility finishes the job. Utility means the God hypothesis, in order to be considered a real theory, needs to meet three prerequisites first. These prerequisites are: 1) the ability to successfully predict certain (specific) events thus validating the theory’s efficacy, 2) the ability to repeat these predictions by third parties and get the same results thus validating the theory’s reliability, and 3) the ability to be falsified when it seems the theory has reached a threshold where explanation eludes us and predictions grow increasingly difficult, or where the theory continuously makes the wrong predictions, so that it may be revised based on the updated (and correct) information—or else discarded in favor of a better, more functional, theory.

Unfortunately, the God hypothesis fails all three aspects of meeting even a rudimentary utility. It does not make predictions, it has not proved itself reliable in any sense, and it is not falsifiable. Therefore, it's not really a valid theory and ought to be rejected until it can meet the basic prerequisites necessary for yielding real results and becoming a reliable theory. As such, it appears, based on real world observation, that God is either non-existent or else supererogatory (in the peripheral sense).

Brief Afterword 
I will not go so far as Nietzsche to say God is dead (that is to say the God concept is dead), but I will say this much, when it comes to understanding the real tangible world, God is so inconsequential as to not even count in the grand scheme of things. And this, for me, suggest that either God is non-existent, or else, simply negligible (i.e., a deistic watchmaker which wound the clock and just sits back in his accutronian mood contented to let things run their own course—in which case such a being is too indistinct, barely even a semblance, of the being believers raucously worship to count as an equivalent substitute for their distinct conceptualization(s) of God).

Wednesday, September 29, 2010

The Problem With Kalam




The Problem With Kalam

Kalam, or more formally the Kalam cosmological argument as presented by the Christian theologian William Lane Craig states:

1.     The Cosmological Argument from Contingency

The cosmological argument comes in a variety of forms. Here’s a simple version of the famous version from contingency:

1.  Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.
2.  If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.
3.  The universe exists.
4.  Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence (from 1, 3).
5.  Therefore, the explanation of the universe’s existence is God (from 2, 4).

Now this is a logically airtight argument. That is to say, if the premises are true, then the conclusion is unavoidable. It doesn’t matter if we don’t like the conclusion. It doesn’t matter if we have other objections to God’s existence. So long as we grant the three premises, we have to accept the conclusion. So the question is this: Which is more plausible—that those premises are true or that they are false?

Herein lies the problem. The Kalam cosmological argument does not presuppose monotheism. In other words, there isn’t anything to suggest that it wasn’t a pantheon of minds/deities/gods which created the universe instead of just one. Why is this a problem? Consider the following logical argument:

1.      The inference that there was only one creating agent is true
2.      The inference that there was more than one creating agent is true
3.      Both can’t be simultaneously true
4.      Therefore, if 1 is true then 2 is false and if 2 is true then 1 is false
5.      Unable to defer to either 1 or 2 the possibility of neither/none

Therefore there is no direct corollary between the inference of any creating agent(s) and the causality of the universe. What does this mean? It means, that like a team of computer programmers toiling away to design a complex computer program, the universe could very well have been designed and brought into existence by an assembly of advanced thinking beings/deities. Furthermore there is no way to deduce whether it was one or a thousand gods who assumedly did the toiling. But since it can’t be both, and both are equally plausible and therefore equally unlikely, neither option can be justified by inference alone, thus none becomes the more likely option—leaving us right back where we started—at ground zero. Therefore the Kalam cosmological argument fails.

Possible Objections and Counter Objections
Actually, I don't think people discuss the personal/necessary being aspect of Craig's argument enough. Personally, I find this is where the chinks in the armor are. Many causes is a huge obstacle for Craig, which is why he keeps ducking the challenge of tackling it head on. Craig's response to this objection on his website Reasonable Faith is utterly lame. According to Craig:

The kalam argument is clearly not consistent with there being a group of deities cavorting with one another prior to the world’s creation, since the argument takes us back to a changeless state which is, I think, timeless. To imagine a group of timeless, unembodied minds somehow acting wholly in concert to create the world brings one awfully close to the doctrine of the Trinity. A Trinitarian (or Unitarian) concept of God seems much more plausible than polytheism’s many gods all independently existing timelessly and acting in concert to create the universe.

Craig might want to occasionally pause and think about what he is saying. As it is, he contradicts himself in the same sentence. First he says a group of deities (with multiple minds) is inconsistent with the Kalam cosmological argument and then reneges the statement immediately afterward to claim a triune deity (with multiple minds) works just fine. What is a trinity if not a group of three? Even if it is one Transcendent personal being, there are at least three distinct personalities/minds. Craig contradicts himself. Three is not one.

Craig still needs to provide a method which allows him to differentiate between one and the many, otherwise he's up the creek without a paddle. Maybe because he believes the Trinity to be one whole entity it's not three separate minds so much as a schizophrenic schism of personality types? How does he figure? He doesn't, he just expects you to agree with him--more special pleading. Likewise what is to differentiate between a necessary deity, existing in a changeless state, and two or more causal agents doing the same? Time is only an added dimension, and is relative, so has nothing to do with how many causes (or causal agents) there can ultimately be (in Transcendent form). 

Also, why can't a pantheon also act as a hive mind? The Borg in Star Trek the Next Generation can do it. I think Craig reveals the limits of his own imagination when he fails to consider such an obvious analogy. Now just make the Borg Transcendent beings, and presto! Craig thinks, for some odd reason, that a pantheon of gods working is concert is harder to grasp than one schizophrenic God. I don't see how a pantheon of, say, three polytheistic gods is harder to grasp than, oh well, a Triune being which is three in one. If you ask me, the concept of three in one is rather convoluted.

Craig simply dismisses the objection as if he's never really thought it through, which is why I have a hard time taking him seriously. He wants people to agree with him, but until he explains how Kalam predicts one necessary causal agent, which so happens to be a complex personal creator being with a schizophrenic personality, I think the objection of many causes is more than valid--it's completely devastating to Craig's entire argument.

Some other objections which might be raised include:

1.      Applying Occam’s razor we find that one god, or a God, is the simplest “explanation” and so has a better chance of being the correct inference. 

a.      Although Occam’s razor is a useful rule of thumb in weeding out unnecessary information, there is nothing the the Kalam cosmological argument which suggests a strict law of parsimony need be observed. Therefore my initial point that multiple gods are just as likely as an inference as one god stand as the primary objection to the validity of the Kalam cosmological argument. Additionally, what’s to suggest a conscious mind of a thinking god is less complex than a quantum event? Indeed, the rule of parsimony cannot be relied upon here. 

2.      Other cosmological evidence, such as fine-tuning and the argument of something rather than nothing, suggest an intentional set of laws which in turn denote a conscious act behind the intentionality of the predetermined parameters. 

a.      Again, there is nothing which presupposes monotheism, even as fine-tuning remains, in my opinion, the best chance of establishing a practical cosmological argument, it doesn’t go far enough to address the initial problem of many gods vs. one god, and so leaves us right back where we started. 

3.      The argument from reason seems to hint at the fact that our own consciousness is a necessary consequence of the detectable intentionality of a greater consciousness. 

a.      Even if we grant this, we cannot forget to overlook the fact that neuroscience offers a good preliminary model for human consciousness. Moreover, if granted, there is still no reason to assume a single consciousness over multiple or plural consciousnesses. What is to suggest that I don’t derive my consciousness from god X while you derive yours from god Y? Still the problem of aggregation remains.

I would predict any other objections will meet the same trouble, therefore my initial point that Kalam doesn’t presuppose monotheism remains valid. As such it still follows that there is no direct corollary between the inference of any creating agent(s) and the causality of the universe.

Identifying Weak Propositions
Whenever people argue over the deductive powers of the Kalam cosmological argument, or any other cosmological argument for that matter, I get confounded. By my reckoning there is no valid reason to even consider the argument or its deductions to begin with. The Kalam cosmological argument as offered by Craig and every other cosmological argument each fail in the same fashion.

Even if we assume the Kalam cosmological argument is true, at best it could only be an inference for a deistic creating agent, but not any specific type of god (personal or otherwise). If the theologian presupposes their version of God then they have simply taken out a qualification they needed to prove their case and are begging the question. Knowing this to be the case, any suggestion that the Kalam cosmological argument is a legitimate inference for God (because the universe exists, therefore must have been caused, thus proves that God is necessary to establish such causality) is simply special pleading.

In truth, however, hinging one’s entire proof for God on two faulty premises is by any epistemic standard a failed argument. Yet what theologian would be willing to admit that they are mistaken? Since such an admission would defeat their purpose of proving the existence of God and offering the argument in the first place they adamantly search for novel ways to keep believing in the validity of an illegitimate argument. Theologians like Craig love to flog a dead horse, hoping that your curiosity will be peaked by the bizarre and strange event long enough to compel you to come over to inquire what he’s on about. This gives the theologian the chance they need to urge you into buying their snake’s oil and have you listen to what they have to say and why they feel it is a valid argument—one that you couldn’t possibly refuse. They’ll likely throw in some ‘eternal salvation’ for free if you hurry up and buy now.

Conclusion
All considered, we find that the Kalam cosmological argument fails to establish any genuine inference that the universe was caused by a creator being whatsoever, and for that reason it is invalid. Simply put, the Kalam cosmological argument fails before it ever begins, and if you ask me that’s a telltale sign of a non-argument. If theologians were more honest with themselves they would reject the Kalam cosmological argument altogether, and without hesitation, on the basis that it is by all accounts something which simply cannot be true by inference alone. Of course, then they would not be able to say that the existence of the universe points to the existence of a divine ‘creator’ being. Well, too bad. I suggest we deal with it and move on.

THREE REASONS I.C.E SHOULDN’T EXIST (The Aftermath of Renee Good's Killing)

“Political language is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.” ― G...