Showing posts with label William Lane Craig. Show all posts
Showing posts with label William Lane Craig. Show all posts

Monday, May 30, 2011

The King of Bullshit: Part Deux


Back in October of 2010, I wrote a polemical called William Lane Craig = King of Bullshit. I still stand by that observation. Even so, it is a hotly contested observation, because there are many many Craig fans out there. Even though I am a detractor of William Lane Craig, I suppose one would have to be a type of fan before one would be willing to bother rebutting WLC in the first place. In that sense, I too am a fan, but I happen to be willing to do what most WLC fans aren’t capable of doing—being critical of WLC.

Regardless of how one engages in due criticism, I was recently criticized for offering “far more delusional bullshit” than anything WLC ever said.  In a recent attack on my article, I was informed that

This post is unintentionally ironic, for it contains far more delusional bullshit than anything I've ever heard Craig say. I won't go as far as claiming you're 'lying,' for as an advocate of "science, reason and intellectual integrity," I won't make the silly mistake of claiming far more than I can justify.

To which I replied:

Actually, I was using bullshit in the technical sense. Craig often
spews unfounded and unproved claims as a matter of fact, often falling
for his own rhetoric--and that is what a bullshitter technically is.

You're using 'bullshit' in the colloquial sense as an ad hominem, most
probably because you've confused the burden of proof.

Besides, I never claimed I I can prove a negative. All I am saying is
that Craig's positive claims are fallacy ridden, without evidence, and
unverified--therefore amount to little more than BS. I refer you to
Graham Oppy's 'Arguing about Gods' for some reasons why what Craig
claims is a matter of fact is, in fact, not.

Now this is where things got interesting. Because my reader felt I was misusing the term “bullshit.” He stated:

That's not quite right. Bullshit in the Frankfurtian sense denotes an utter disregard for the truth or falsity of a claim. If, as you say, Craig “spews unfounded and unproved claims as a matter of fact” (which is itself a false claim, but let’s put that aside for the moment), and often falls “for his own rhetoric,” then it seems that the best we can conclude is that Craig is confused or delusional, and not Bullshitting. 

Savvy readers will recall that I was, in fact, stating that Craig often exhibits an utter disregard for the truth or falsity of a claim. Indeed, I quoted him saying that very exact thing! In his book Reasonable Faith Craig affirms:

Should a conflict arise between the witness of the Holy Spirit to the fundamental truth of the Christian faith and beliefs based on argument and evidence, then it is the former which must take precedence over the latter, not vice versa.  (Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, Revised edition, Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1994, p. 36.)

By Craig’s own admission that he would gladly disregard beliefs based on evidence and sound arguments if it should conflict with his face! By the Frankfurtian sense, then, this qualifies as pure bullshit. Luckily, however, I wasn’t speaking in the Frankfurtian sense, but rather, I was specifically using the George Carlin sense of the word. However, in my opinion, if you need to have someone get a dictionary out to explain bullshit to them, either they’re dumber than you thought they were, or it’s probably not they who have the problem in recognizing bullshit when they see it (just an FYI).

He went on to add:

But there’s a further problem. You accuse Craig of lying in your post, which you seem to think is follows from being a Bullshitter. But being a Bulshitter is distinct from being a liar (as Frankfurt makes clear). The Bullshitter misrepresents, but he does not lie. So which is it -- is Craig a Bullshitter or a liar? Or is he a Bullshitter some of the time, and a liar at other times?

Exactly! The latter part that is. Admittedly, amid my rhetorical parrying, I may have engaged in some question begging. Indeed, I didn’t make the distinction between a WLC Lie and a WLC pile of BS.  I didn’t think such a distinction was necessary. But apparently I was mistaken.

A WLC pile of BS is like the above example where he claims that a little magical man lives inside him, and that this little magical man is more right than anything in the world, and therefore is real world evidence and logic should disagree with the little magical man—then Craig confesses he’s going to side with the little magic man and not the valid, factual, evidence.

So when Craig claims that he knows what he knows because of the little magic man inside him, we know we are dealing with a case of WLC BS.

A WLC Lie, on the other hand, is something quite different (my commenter was right to point out the fact that there is a distinction). A WLC lie goes something like this: Craig will often state a truth claim—such as God exists, or that the universe is caused, etc. The problem here is this, with regard to the universe even our best scientists, cosmologists, and theoretical physicists do not know exactly how the universe came about. They have theories, based off evidence and observation, which is more than Craig can claim (his argument is that God caused the universe and that we can know this because of the properties of the universe distinctly happen to reveal a Creator—never mind this is a horrible case of circular reasoning).

The lie here is implicit—Craig is saying that he is right, but then (as we have seen) makes the habit of admitting he prefers not to rely on evidence when it should contradict his heartfelt convictions (eh-hem… I mean the little magic man inside him), and this wouldn’t be such a problem if we were dealing with a crazy person. But WLC is (supposedly) a well respected philosopher. Yet the problem is two-fold, because here we have a theologian making a scientific statement which flies in the face of the entire scientific community. In other words, Craig is affirming that his science is more correct than all the scientists in the world combined—and whether or not the cosmos has a cause is beside the point—Craig is deliberately lying about what he knows (or thinks he knows). Of course he doesn’t know better than any of the *actual bona fide scientists, cosmologists, and theoretical physicists. It’s just a bald faced WLC lie.

Now, I’m sure any WLC fan could just as easily pad their defense of Craig by saying that, perhaps, Craig really believes he does know better than most of the Earth’s scientists about something he holds no special training in, and that instead of actually telling a lie—the argument could be made—that Craig is actually delusional. Well, I admit, this is a strong possibility—but what is a delusion is not a lie we tell to ourselves?

Furthermore, Craig may believe what he does based on bad evidence, just as there are Climate change and Holocaust deniers, but in the case of the former vs. the latter, I give Craig the benefit of the doubt—because I don’t take him to be a complete moron. Which means that he’s most likely under a healthy delusion—but many religious people are. In fact, most religious people say that very exact thing about people in other religions—something Craig has done numerous times. In fact, Craig often decries atheism calling it downright absurd.

My commenter then asked:

How can you tell when someone knows the truth and tries to perpetrate a falsehood (lying), and when someone simply doesn’t care about the truth (Bullshitting)?

Well, in the case of Craig, that was fairly easy, because he explicitly admitted that he doesn’t care about the truth—since his personal faith-based convictions trump any possible truth that doesn’t conform to his “reasonable faith.” But usually we can tell someone is practicing a deliberate falsehood when they slip up, make a few mistakes, let us in on their tells, and that’s when a pattern of unreliability forms. Craig is guilty of both, since he’s claimed to know more than he possibly could and he has concocted a strange fantasy about being tuned into some sort of God-hotline via the little man living inside him, so I really don’t think it’s necessary to nitpick the details here. I could cite more examples, but that would only serve to strengthen my case.

The philosopher Matt McCormick has summed up the problem with WLC nicely:

It’s a mistake for serious philosophical atheists to devote too much time and energy to dealing with Craig because he’s a person in this field who seems to be shouting the loudest and the most.  Craig’s arguments have been dealt with at length and with devastating consequences by many people, including myself.  Craig is rarely deterred by any of these critiques, and he is not prone to acknowledge any objection or weakness no matter how clearly it has been illustrated.  But we shouldn’t mistake his pit-bull persistence and rhetorical skill in defending Christianity for something other than what it is.  The unassailability of Christianity in his mind bestows a weird kind of pointlessness to his debates.  As he and his followers see it, debates can only serve to corroborate what they already know is true—Jesus is lord.  If Craig “wins,” which he often does given his skill, then that just vindicates Christian belief once again, if he doesn’t (and few of his supporters would acknowledge that this ever happens), it doesn’t matter because he would never change his mind, and the private, magical, Holy Spirit knowledge he has in his mind makes any consideration of arguments or the evidence irrelevant.  At this point, given what he’s said about the indefeasibilty of Christian belief, I’m not inclined to take anything that Craig or his followers say seriously until I’m convinced that they are playing the same game with the same rules of rationality that the rest of us are.  An essential principle of rationality, as I see it, is that all beliefs are defeasible, and subject to the tribunal of reason. 

Next, I chose to respond to his attack on my person—mainly the allegation that what I said contained far more delusional bullshit than anything WLC has ever said. You will have to pardon me for finding that hard to believe. In fact, to the best of my knowledge, nothing I stated could even be remotely misconstrued as BS. Thus, I felt compelled to inform my commenter that he was guilty of throwing out an ad hominem, by basically calling my argument delusional bullshit, which to my dismay he actually defended.

Given your patent confusion concerning lies and Bullshit, I think that my reading was justified.

Confusion does not a bullshitter make. Indeed, we must ask ourselves, if I am unclear on something I have spent a long time thinking about, it is probably because it hasn’t been clearly relayed, or else I am missing vital information, or I am a complete moron. Either which way, that doesn’t make me “more delusional” or more of a “bullshitter” despite any misunderstandings I may have. For example, if I’m driving to a party with my wife, and we come to an intersection, and she asks me “Which way do we turn?” If I can’t remember the precise directions, I may take a guess, and say “left,” or perhaps change my mind, “No, wait, right!”

Because I have taken a blind guess, in my confusion, does not make me a bullshitter. After all, I have a 50/50 chance of being right, and more importantly, if I am wrong I can simply correct myself. Let’s not confuse the issue. God’s existence is not 50/50 odds. At least when I took a guess I was dealing with actual tangible realities—i.e., left and right exist. We know what they mean. Craig is dealing with a hypothetical. It would be strange, I feel, to accuse me of being delusional because I didn’t apply equal chances to a hypothetical without a referent in reality. I could very well inform you about all the imaginary directions I didn’t take, such as negative infinity right, instead of normal ordinary right, but that doesn’t by default mean that negative infinity right has a 50/50 chance of being correct because we all know that the needle on a compass can point East or West.

I don’t see how adding that I am a delusional bullshitter helps his case prove that Craig is not. I mean, it seems to me that this is an attack on my argument and reasoning, but it is mainly irrelevant for the reasons I just discussed. About the ad hominem remark he responded:

The ad hominem fallacy is, well, a fallacy. As such, it can only be applied to arguments. In my initial post, I didn’t make an argument, but an observation. Since observations are not arguments, they cannot be fallacious, and hence cannot be instances of the ad hominem fallacy.

Actually, if we recall, when my commenter mentioned the validity of my arguments and the soundness of my reasoning he was making an argument of sorts—he argued that my arguments and reasoning contained more delusional bullshit than anything Craig ever said. Although, what ‘delusional bullshit’ would that be exactly? That Craig lies? We’ve caught him doing just that. That he is delusional? Yes, and if you don’t believe me, just ask the little magic man living inside of him, and which speaks to him, to confirm.

In actuality, it was I who was making the observation, and since observations are not arguments, well, they cannot be fallacious. Therefore, to unjustly call my criticism of WLC “delusional bullshit” is, in point of fact, an ad hominem.

I presumed he threw out the ad hominem to imply that I was full of it, unlike Craig. I mean, one can only presume, after all. As such, I reminded him that the burden of proof is not on me to prove any of Craig’s truth claims. After all, we are specifically talking about justifying our claims. All I have done is point out that Craig’s claims are unjustified—and he is either lying to bolster his faith, or lying to convince himself the lie is actually a truth. I gave an example of each.

If Craig’s claims were supported by evidence, and panned out, then I could say—maybe there is something to this God hypothesis of his. But since that’s not the case, it’s not my burden to disprove God simply to defend my position that Craig’s God hypothesis is all BS. I mention this, precisely because nobody would claim that my argument against Craig’s position was total BS unless they already bought into Craig’s position and didn’t believe my examples (which would be hard to do considering they come right from the mouth of WLC).

So what would I be BS-ing exactly, the fact that Craig is undeniably right, and I just can’t deal with it except by calling him delusional and a liar? If so, then we better start taking Craig awfully serious when he says he knows more than all of the world’s scientists or when he claims to be in communication with the little magic man who lives inside him. If not, then I have nothing to lose by calling BS.

I have no idea whatsoever how you managed to come up with a burden of proof reference there.

Now you do. And by proxy, we should see how it is relevant. If Craig didn’t believe that God was actually real, he probably wouldn’t be bullshitting others about strange things, such as the little magic man that lives within his mind or the fact that he’s smarter than Albert Einstein, Richard Feynman, and Stephen Hawking combined. This revelation alone should cause us pause, because what it really means is that Craig isn’t willing to change his mind when his beliefs fail to hold up to scrutiny (hence the relevancy of the referenced Reasonable Faith quote) which proves just how delusional he really is.

As for my statement that Craig's positive claims are fallacy ridden, without evidence, and unverified—therefore amount to little more than BS, my commenter responded by trying to correct me, yet again (granted I may have been unclear about the connection the first time—I just figured everyone would see the obvious—but I don’t mind breaking it down—it’s all part of the fun of exposing the BS). The way I see it is the depth of Craig’s delusions directly feed into the level of the BS. Granted my commenter is right, they aren’t always mutually related, but in this instance I think it’s safe to say they are.

Again, these are not sufficient conditions of Bullshit. (They’re also demonstrably false, but again, that’s another issue).

Again, I’m going to agree that this is usually the case, but stick with my prior comment that, in this instance, the depth of the delusion is feeding the level of the BS we are hearing from Craig. How could it not? Craig believes in Christianity, and all of the strange theological beliefs which come packaged with his particular version of the faith. It would be incorrect to assume that none of this plays to his delusion, and that this conviction that his delusion is the truth does not, on occasion, compel him to tell lies about what he thinks he knows.

In fact, Craig pretends to know a lot. He knows how the universe began, he knows where morality comes from, he knows everyone who disagrees with him will go to an imaginary place called hell, he knows that everyone who thinks different is just being absurd, and he knows that he can never be proved wrong because he has the permission to deny all evidence which would serve to disprove everything he thinks he knows. I’m sorry, but this is just WLC being unreasonable on top of everything else.

I referred my commenter to read Graham Oppy's Arguing about Gods which reveals further the reasons that the majority of what Craig claims is malarkey. My reader defensively submitted:

Yet again, this is not a sufficient condition of Bullshit. If you have any specific examples in mind, I’d be interested to see them (your charges are noticeably lacking examples and support).

I gave two knock down examples, 1) a WLC lie, and 2) a WLC pile of BS. I suggested Graham Oppy’s book because it reveals the philosophical faultiness of many of the theistic arguments which Craig employs, and which would help inform the reader as to the critical method of detecting BS when happened upon.

I wasn’t arguing a conditional prerequisite for BS, I was suggesting a means of better understanding why the arguments Craig relies on to form his belief system amount to little more than fallacies mixed in with BS—just think of the fallacies as little specks of corn contained in all that BS. Yet my reader wanted an example, so here's one. 


On his website Reasonable Faith Craig takes issue with a criticism of the Kalam where a commenter said it doesn’t differentiate between monotheism and polytheism (which it technically doesn’t). Craig’s response was mind numbingly retarded:

The kalam argument is clearly not consistent with there being a group of deities cavorting with one another prior to the world’s creation, since the argument takes us back to a changeless state which is, I think, timeless. To imagine a group of timeless, unembodied minds somehow acting wholly in concert to create the world brings one awfully close to the doctrine of the Trinity. A Trinitarian (or Unitarian) concept of God seems much more plausible than polytheism’s many gods all independently existing timelessly and acting in concert to create the universe.

I hope you can see what just happened here. Craig claimed that the Kalam argument, as he knows it, is incompatible with a polytheistic outlook (although he offers no support for this claim). He immediately states that a Trinitarian view (one which believes in a Trinity) is, however, compatible. Wait a minute… what?

It makes one wonder that, what if the polytheism only consisted of three deities and no more? Still a polytheism by any other definition. Or what if the polytheism was a single entity which embodied all other deities, sort of like the Dashavatar of Vishnu in Hinduism? Sounds an awful lot like the Christian concept of the Trinity, if you ask me. Yet since there is virtually no doctrinal support for the Trinity, the very notion that Craig takes it upon himself to define what the Trinity is and isn’t compatible with is amusing.

I personally have always found the Mono-theism comprised of a Trinity to be problematic. Even if one is arguing that it’s one entity with various facets, the same could be said about other entities, such as Vishnu and the aforementioned Avatars. My only question is, how is Craig so certain that One Jehova x Jewish Son x Holy Ghost more (or less) plausible than Vishnu x Jewish Avatar x Ghostly Avatar? It all basically sounds the same to me, but that’s beside the point, because my position is that without a way to test Craig’s claims—he is literally BS-ing you.

As for other examples and support? Do I really need them? I mean, do I need to give more examples of Craig claiming he knows more than the entire scientific community at large, or that he has a magic man living in him feeding him communicates directly from the mind of God from beyond the outer limits of space and time, or that he can’t seem to tell the difference between the number 1 and the number 3? Really?

Personally, I think that would be a better use of a theologians time. But like Thomas Paine, I believe that theology is essentially the study of nothing, so I’m not going to waste my time poking holes in Craig’s theological considerations any more than necessary to get the point across. Natural theology, as far as I’m concerned, is exactly like my fellow SCEPTIC Mike D. states:

“Natural theology overestimates the value of our intuitions, which are often mistaken, but it commits its greatest folly simply by erroneously presuming that our understanding of metaphysics can be used to make inferences about the supernatural…. Since the supernatural, by definition, is not bound by our metaphysical rules, we can't assume that things that hold true for us – intuitive or not – hold true beyond us.”

In the meantime, however, we should all feel free to call William Lane Craig on his BS—and point out when he’s talking nonsense or else fabricating entire fantasies and passing them off as universal truths.

Sunday, April 10, 2011

Krauss, Kagan, & Sam Harris vs. William Lane Craig: General thoughts on the Debates

I don’t know, but it seems to me that Krauss offered a lot of good solid information. Meanwhile, WLC just stuck to his guns and did what he always does, spout off orthodox Evangelical conviction with that ever annoying constant appeal to authority. I mean, I already know what Christians think. I was one for three decades. Move it along.

At the end of the day, however, I feel I learned more from Krauss than Craig. It seems to me most WLC fans are just taking the devotional tract and agreeing whole heartedly with Craig because he is simply reaffirming what they already purport to believe. Besides this, I think much of what Krauss was saying may have gone over many audience member's heads.

For example, Krauss' comment that infinity adds up to a finite number seems to have been lost on most people. Certainly Craig seemed to be unaware of the implications, and how it renders his A theory of time argument to establish a first cause moot, as he let it slide. Or maybe Craig showed some restraint knowing better than to argue advanced theoretical physics with a real physicist of Krauss’ caliber (although, admittedly, it wasn't at all obvious if he did). Obviously Krauss was struggling to dumb it down enough for the lay audience to grasp, given the short time frame and restrictive format, but even so he still offered interesting morsels of knowledge, like the infinity thing. Meanwhile, one has to wonder how many more times Craig is going to tell us that Jesus rose from the dead. Um, yeah. We get that’s what Christians believe. Anything new to offer in the way of convincing evidence for the existence of said God? No? Well that says a lot right there.

There's only so many times you can flog a dead horse before even the most ardent believers must admit it's never getting back up. But I guess it shows how powerful the confirmation bias really is. And that's what it felt like watching the debate, knowing all the Craig fans will agree with him that the horse is alive and kicking, while all the people who paid close attention to Krauss will realize that Craig never offered anything tangible in the way of evidence--just conjecture and more appeals to authority.

If your tally it like a high school debate, the winner receives points for answering each argument with an official rebuttal, then Craig clearly won. But notice how Craig loads his comments so they all have dozens of points, making it nigh impossible for anyone to ever properly score against him. Yes, Craig is good at winning the debates by this measure, but if you're talking about winning actual arguments, well, Craig fails every time. Craig is a debater, not a dialectic, and so for him it's about the appearance of winning--not actually having any valid arguments or justifiable truths.



Then there is the Sam Harris debate. The full debate can be viewed here after the jump.

One thing I might point out is that Craig is merely ascribing "moral goodness" to God. He's not, by any means, empirically verifying it in the real world. While I agree Craig is talking about an ontological grounds for morality, his proving it remains another matter.

It doesn't matter how he words his comments, or whether or not he dodges the Euthyphro dilemma, because he's not really talking about anything more than a theological concept within the active constraints of his own theology. A theology which preaches God is good... even when such a claim is certifiably contradicted within his own religion's Holy Book. Sam brought this up several times but Craig insisted he was merely changing the subject of debate.

The only reason WLC believes God is morally good is because he is a Christian, and that's one of the peculiar things Christians believe. But the God of his own Holy book is not so moral, all one need do is read the OT to learn this. Sam made a few quips about cutting out Leviticus and Deuteronomy, and got a few chuckles, but Craig didn't seem to get the joke. So, it seemed to me, Craig's assumptions about God's goodness, or God equating goodness, are merely being ascribed and are, in actuality, without basis.

And people actually claim Craig wins his debates. Again, claiming objective morality exists is different than proving your God concept is the embodiment of this fundamental morality. Craig went through some philosophical demonstrations to show how he derives a moral law giver from the revelation of objective morals in reality, and stated that if there was no moral law giver we wouldn't have morality. This comes back to Divine Command theory, but Wes Morriston has shown how absurd Divine Command theory is when trying to claim God is the basis for an ontological morality. Morriston raises all the same objections I have with Craig's version of ontological morality and God, so check out his paper when you get the chance.

Sam's entire point that, contrary to Craig's position, there is a way to describe a moral landscape where objective morality is, in theory, not only recognizable but also practicable seemed not to have any sway on Craig who sat jotting down notes for his rebuttal. Craig then accused Sam of failing to establish an ontological basis for morality, or rather, said Sam had ducked the responsibility. Maybe Sam didn't explain his concept clearly enough, or maybe Craig just wanted to score more points against the opposition, but Sam's entire basis for ontological morality rests on human consciousness. Meaning, if we were unaware of the suffering and flourishing of sentient beings we wouldn't be aware of right and wrong, or good and evil, either. But Craig seemed to (perhaps deliberately) forget he was talking to a bona fide neuroscientist--and Craig believes objective morality would exist in a universe without humans, since God would still be the arbiter of morality. Whether or not Craig was aware of it, Sam demolished this notion by painting an example of a conceivable universe which was only populated by rocks, which could neither feel pain nor be aware of it. Thus, Sam's suggestion is that moral awareness can only come from sentient beings with consciousness, like ourselves.

In this respect, I feel Sam Harris definitely won. He not only gave perimeters for a pragmatic objective morality, but his book The Moral Landscape also backs up the claim with a plethora of up to date cognitive research. Craig spent a surprising amount of energy misrepresenting many of the arguments in Sam's book, but Sam politely reminded the audience to pick up a copy and read the quotes in context.

Craig's claim about God and morality is based on whether or not you buy into the supernatural claims of Christianity, derived from a tenuous and archaic text which has very little to do with morality, which was one of Sam's points. Craig says this line of reasoning had nothing to do with the debate, that he wasn't arguing Scriptural validity but, rather, arguing for a comprehensive good which can be derived from God's goodness, i.e., an ontological morality. Right and wrong exist, and Craig used the analogy of light and darkness, something we all know what it means even before we know exactly what it is. But his argument that goodness exists objectively, therefore forming an ontological basis for morality, therefore must stem from God is merely an attribution of goodness onto God. If God was not good, as Sam stated numerous times, then logically such a conclusion couldn't be made. But Craig feels that since he attributes God with a certain goodness, that this accounts for the goodness we find in reality. Or to state it Craig's way: goodness exists in reality therefore evidence for a moral law giver.

Luckily, nobody questioned Craig on the syllogism, and he was able to say Sam hadn't yet provided any counter arguments to his claims. Actually, Sam had. Sam had denied the attribution of moral goodness to God. So Craig then attempted to explain how God's nature is ultimately good just by our awareness of right and wrong. He attempted to do this with his second point about is and ought statements, but this is where the syllogism became obvious for those paying attention and taking notes. One of the questioners caught Craig on this, but Craig brushed his question aside and simply reiterated his second points again. Thus Craig never actually answered how God's goodness provides reason for why we ought to be good (should a good God exist). That is to say, even if God was good, what imperative is there to act good? Sam views the imperative as the desire to avoid hell, but Craig denied (several times) that this has any sway on the questions of God's innate goodness. Denying it doesn't make it so however, because as Sam pointed out, a God who would condemn innocents to suffer eternally couldn't, in point of fact, be a good or loving God. Therefore, contrary to what Craig may think, one can't simply attribute God with goodness because he believes in God's supposed goodness. Yet Craig spent a lot of time stating the two claims were not mutual... that hell has nothing to do with God's nature. Sam didn't fall for the red herring and kept on track.

I'm no moral philosopher, but it seems Sam definitely has mapped out a plausible way for morality to be tested, which would supply the ought. And if morality is concerned with human suffering and well-being, then our flourishing would be the ought which brackets our objective moral understanding. Meanwhile, Craig seemed vehemently to try not to understand this point.



After the debate with Harris, Craig posted a series of baffling comments denigrating the audience members and atheists in general. Apparently Craig thinks everyone is stupid. At least Krauss' Facebook comments after debate attacked the faulty reasoning and Craig's syllogisms, not the audience members.

Reading Craig's comments struck me as peculiar in more ways than one, because he claims the audience members asked stupid questions, and then blames it on the secularists in attendance, even as it was more than apparent that it was the Christian audience members who asked the most unintelligent (or unintelligible) questions (remember the one about bleeding crackers, and that guy who had visions from God about the moral sanctioning of sodomy--classic). Craig even appeared to get flustered by the questioner's comments and berated his fellow Christian, telling him that he was stupid for asking that and then called him a faker--implying he wasn't even a real Christian (although the kid looked like he was about to cry). Mike over at the A-Unicornist has a breakdown of the mud flung by Craig and his flurry of ad hominems, worth reviewing here.

Mike's closing comment is golden, and needs repeating. Reflecting about the folly of Craig, Mike writes:

"But remember Isaac Newton: He gave us the laws of motion, the laws of optics, universal gravitation, and differential calculus. He was also an alchemist. You can be very smart in general, and very right about many things, and still hold misguided beliefs about certain things. Craig's intellectual hubris, in my view, belies the fundamental weakness of his position; if his reasoning were better, he wouldn't have to resort to self-aggrandizement and the denigration of his intellectual antagonists."

Personally, I'd like to see WLC sit down with Sam Harris and discuss moral issues one on one, as he recently did with Shelly Kagan. I think Craig is out of his element when he has to rely on his actual brain power and not the audience's general credulity. Also, I have to hand it to Kagan who handled Craig extremely well. Given a similar situation, I'm sure Harris would have devastated Craig with hard core facts along with Sam's trademark intellectual prowess.

In conclusion, Craig is good at scoring points and "winning" debates, but he suffers miserably at winning arguments. Ultimately, I guess it depends on what you're hoping to get out of watching a debate like this. Personally, I just enjoy it to hear the new ideas, which rarely come from the Christian camp. Their ideas are all well established--and there isn't really anything novel to gain from them. That's why I think the New Atheists are succeeding... they are offering food for thought.


Tuesday, February 15, 2011

Entropy Kills Kalam! Boom Shaka Laka!


The Argument from Entropy
Initially I conceived the argument from entropy as a contra-argument to the Kalam cosmological argument. Also, logically speaking the argument from entropy is backed by real observation, and is based on the second law of thermodynamics, hence the argument from entropy. But what is it exactly? The argument from entropy is:

1.     God created everything (including life)
2.     Entropy is certain
3.     Entropy will extinguish all life
4.     God has the power to prevent entropy, but doesn’t
5.     A God of love would prevent entropy
6.     Therefore God cannot be a loving being

Here we see that, logically speaking, entropy rules out a loving creator God. Even so, it is true that some deity may still be responsible for having created a universe capable of supporting life, but only insofar as this fulfills his ultimate purpose to, subsequently, have it annihilated (via entropy). As such, this rules out the Christian God, since we know that the Christian God is all loving and has the power to prevent certain death of his beloved creation. Failing to do so would suggest that it is not a loving God who created the universe; should a supernatural creating agent be involved. Thus the creator of this universe cannot be the Christian God.

Kalam Assumes Wrongly
Proponents of the Kalam cosmological argument assume that God is a personal being, a being of immense love, who intended there to be the flourishing of life—not impending heat death. But low and behold, the second law of thermodynamics is a veritable fact! As plain as day, we can see that any life which arises will just as quickly be snuffed out of existence, and this regrettable fact is evidence that God’s real desire is to have all things in existence annihilated. This means God is capriciously creating life only to distinguish it. It also means he is not technically a creator being, but rather, a being of destruction. Since the argument from entropy is predicated on real observations, and Kalam is predicated on the assumption of an uncaused cause (which we’ll get to momentarily), we know that the argument from entropy overrules the Kalam cosmological argument.

The Cornucopia Conundrum
Another reason the argument from entropy overrides the Kalam cosmological argument is that it is more practical. Unlike the Kalam, it does not generate the problem of inestimable quantities of excess gods. A Christian detractor criticized the argument from entropy, stating:

I am not sure how your ‘entropy argument’ defeats Kalam. Kalam makes no claim about the nature of the goodness of God or the permanence of the universe, per se, so claiming that somehow entropy indicates God isn’t what Christians suppose Him to be is irrelevant in this case... and I am not sure what it has to do with Kalam at all.

Okay, let’s break it down. The entire premise of Kalam, and the cosmological argument in general, rests on the theological foundation of Christianity as a proof for the existence of God. While is need not refer to the Christian God specifically, as it does not presuppose monotheism, it is most frequently employed by Christian theologians.

The prior assumption that the Creator being is the God of Christianity denotes a distinction between the types of gods we may be speaking of. Other religions have other concepts, but we cannot divorce the theological basis of the Kalam without losing all referent to the sort of deity it is trying to prove. After all, many gods are supposedly capable of creating the universe, but somehow I doubt the Kalam cosmological argument is making the claim that Brahma is the creator of the cosmic waters (i.e., the universe), in which he deposited the seed of life, in the form of a golden egg, called the hiranyagarbha, in which it was born itself as Brahma, the creator of the universe.

However, Christians presumptively claim that their God concept is the only viable one, i.e. the one true God. This is an inlaid confirmation bias, a feature of Christian thought, which, as it so happens, conveniently gets rid of the problem of having to weed through excess gods. Such an expedient fix may ease the believer’s difficulty in having to take seriously other religion’s god concepts, while escaping the heavy burden of weeding through and endless series of excess gods, testing god hypothesis after god hypothesis, to find the correct one predicted by Kalam.

If Kalam merely intended to prove that a god (singular, lowercase deity), then without defining it as, quote unquote, “the Christian God,” any other god would do. Therefore the confirmation bias within Christianity acts as a filter which allows only one god concept to properly be considered. As such, this confirmation bias is the reason the Kalam cosmological argument only intends to prove the existence of just one god—the Christian God—even as the Kalam cosmological argument does not presuppose monotheism.[i]

Knowing this we can safely assume that the Kalam cosmological argument, as argued for by Christian theologians, does make specific claims about the nature of the goodness of God and the permanence of the universe, because such claims are married to Christian theology and, as we have seen, cannot be so easily divorced. 

Foundations of the Kalam Cosmological Argument
Knowing that the Kalam cosmological argument does, in fact, refer to the Christian God, as Christian theologian William Lane Craig maintains, we can make some simple deductions based on the provided context. Let’s simplify this into formal logic and see how it works out.

According to Christian Belief
1.     God exists
2.     God is a creator being
3.     Everything in existence was created
4.     Therefore God created all

Following modal logic, we know that since God created everything he must be the initial cause of creation. Theologians then semantically manipulate the language by saying God is the “uncaused cause” which created the universe. Basically, saying something is an “uncaused cause” is the same as saying that it “just is.” How can we hope to argue against something that “just is”? Checkmate skeptics! God just is, deal with it. Never mind that this is nothing more than unconfirmed, desperate, special pleading.

Yet the Kalam cosmological argument goes one step further than this and suggests that God transcends all physical reality. What this means is that he is beyond space and time, he literally transcends reality. Which is sort of like saying God exists outside of the theoretical framework, and this is clearly meant to safeguard God from disproof. Now, according to Christian theological reasoning, God just is and since this is an unfalisfiable claim, we can neither confirm or disconfirm it, and so must take it on faith. Religious people tend to like unfalsifiable premises because they are a lot like Invisible Pink Unicorns. So be weary of such obvious pitfalls. Side-step them and move on.

Before we come back to the argument from entropy, however, let’s better define God as to discover why his inborn nature denotes that he act as creating agent.

According to Christian Belief
1.     God is a loving being
2.     God’s will is for there to be life
3.     God created all life (from 2)
4.     Therefore God love’s all life (from 1 and 3)

This defines God’s character, according to Christian belief, that he is a creator, is a loving God, and so, as a consequence, loves his creation infinitely. Allowing for the Christian understanding paves the way for the Kalam cosmological argument.

Two Logical Inferences from the Argument from Entropy
Now let’s talk about why the argument from entropy is problematic for the Kalam cosmological argument.

Let us consider two options regarding the consequences that arise from the argument from entropy.

Option 1
It is likely that the universe we live in is the byproduct of a capricious and unloving supreme being in which we are merely anomalous life forms, accidents of an ill-fated universe predestined to annihilation.

Implication
If so, for me personally, this is a frightening prospect and one religious believers ought to seriously ponder. Does such a description, as the argument from entropy provides, derived from observable reality, fit with the Christian notion of God? If not, then they are mistaken about the nature of their God. Whereas evil god theory accounts for the second law of thermodynamics, the Christian concept of God does not. In fact, the Christian concept of God, as we saw above, is falsified by the argument from entropy.

Option 2
It is likely that the universe exists as it naturally is, minus supernatural agents/assumptions, and therefore the observed entropy simply reflects the sort of universe we happen to live in.

Implication
If so, tough luck, but I still find it more desirable than being made a pawn in some mad-as-a-march-hair deity’s rigged chess game. Option two contains the more plausible answer, since unlike the philosophical premise of the first one, no ad hoc assumptions about initial causes are being made. Applying Occam’s razor we see the supernatural premise of a creating agent is unnecessary to explain entropy, therefore the second option is the more feasible of the two.

Asking the questions, “what sort of universe do we live in” and “which option most accurately depicts it?” allows us to rephrase these options as a logical deduction. It goes something like this: Using Occam’s razor to cut out the extemporaneous, option one falls away, since all supernatural agents/assumptions are unnecessary. Heat entropy can be explained as a natural consequence of the sort of universe we live in without invoking prior supernatural causes. Thus option two becomes the more conceivable choice. Accordingly, the best logical inference is that God is not required for the sort of universe we find ourselves in, and more over, the God of Christianity is incompatible with the sort of universe we do find ourselves in. As such, we can safely assume the Christian God does not exist.

Now, you can check my reasoning and see if I have made some sort of oversight, but I have thought long and hard about this, I have double and triple checked the logic, and I simply do not see what I could have overlooked.


About Beginnings
For Kalam to work God must exist necessarily so that he may be established as an uncaused cause, but I would caution this is pure sophist speculation. It does not follow from any logical deduction that I am aware of. Christians often presume we lack evidence of things coming into existence absent of any known cause. Anything which came into existence without a cause would defeat the idea that the universe could only come into existence via God’s divine will. Meaning, that if there was any evidence which showed us that the universe may come into existence without the aid of God, well then, this would defeat the Kalam cosmological argument. Luckily we are in possession of such evidence.

Quantum mechanics has measured the energy patterns of a proton coming in and out of existence with no apparent cause.

If the universe is uncaused, and just is, but exists none-the-less, then we have no need to ask about the cause. Kalam then posits God is the cause—which we have absolutely no reason to invoke. If the universe spontaneously came into existence, as quantum mechanics suggests, then again, we have no valid reason to invoke God.

The Circle that Begot a Triangle: Expounding the Analogy
According to Kalam: God is an uncaused cause; the universe is caused; therefore God preceded the universe and therefore must have caused it. That’s the reasoning behind Kalam anyway.

According to my analogy: A circle which is uncaused just is; a triangle is caused; therefore the circle which preceded the triangle must have caused it. Notice there is no actual link between a circle which just is and the existence of the triangle.

Thus asking whether an uncaused cause is related to the beginning of what it purportedly caused is ineffective. There is no valid relationship to connect God (the uncaused cause which just is) to the universe’s existence any more so than there is an uncaused circle (which just is) denotes any relationship to the existence of a triangle.

The theological premise that an uncaused cause caused our universe, and that God is such an uncaused causer, is not merely illogical, but hubristic in the highest sense of the word. It would be like saying that an uncaused circle caused a triangle, therefore any triangle which exists must have had a beginning, therefore a cause, thus the circle (which just is) really exists. Thinking this way too long is bound to give you a headache.

Worse still, somehow the nature of the triangle, it having three distinct angles, sides of discernible length, etc., is proof the circle (which just is) also happens to be loving circle of all triangular beginnings, for he loved them enough to give the unique properties which define triangles (three acute angles connected by three line segments—just as theologians claim God’s love also sponsored his desire to create life and therefore the life sustaining properties unique to our universe are evidence of God). Seriously, this is how backwards the reasoning of the Kalam cosmological argument is.

Recall that when we restate the Kalam’s first premise, to reflect our more practical understanding of the observable universe, we come up with: all physical reality which exists has a beginning and most probably a cause. As a lucky side-effect, all the other cause claims fall away, but the meaning is retained. Things that begin to exist usually have causes. But this does nothing to suggest God is that cause. For all we know, there may not have been any cause, i.e. the universe may have spontaneously erupted out of Quantum fluctuations, called a Quantum singularity. Let’s not overlook the fact that it’s called a singularity for a reason.

Therefore invoking God as an uncaused cause, proves illogical to begin with, and has nothing to do with the existence of the universe. Positing an uncaused cause as the cause to our beginning, then, is simply superfluous and is not necessary in establishing the universe’s existence. Do Quantum fluctuations require the existence of God? How so? That’s what I’d like to know. Couldn’t quantum events themselves be considered uncaused causes? Then what purpose serves God? God causing the universe simply does not follow from logical deduction, and so is, in philosophical terms, a poor inference. Just as an uncased circle is a poor inference for the existence of a triangle.

The Bottom Line
I do realize that the Kalam is arguing for the existence of God, not the existence of the universe, or of imaginary circles. But when pondering philosophical subjects, such as these, it is important to keep a distinction between analogies which aid in the description of the concept, and the concept itself. I think people often confuse or conflated the two. Analogies aren’t exact, mind you, they’re analogous.

The bottom line is God’s existence does not necessarily follow from logical processes. We cannot get from uncaused circles to triangles any more so than we can get from God to the universe. This is why the Kalam is a non-sequitur. It hasn’t proved God, nor has it explained the origins of the universe (to any relatable degree), even as it pretends to do both.

When we consider entropy, matters get severely complicated. As I have shown, the sort of universe we live in where the second law of thermodynamics is a veritable fact leads us to conclude that should God have created such a universe, he is either evil (a fact which is completely incompatible with the Christian God), or else, more probably, he does not exist as entropy can be explained without invoking supernatural agents (the simpler solution).



[i] The Kalam cosmological argument does not presuppose monotheism, let alone a personal God. Instead it allows for various conceptualizations of god. Ive written about this problem before in my essay entitled The Problem with Kalam (see here). Christian confirmation bias, however, is the only thing requiring Kalam be about the God of Christianity.

Monday, October 18, 2010

William Lane Craig = King of Bullshit



Most of what comes out of William Lane Craig's mouth is purely fantasy invented by William Lane Craig. When a person engages in serious discussions of heavy philosophical topics to boldly say whatever fantastically inspired puerile nonsense which he can conjure up without a moments thought, he is practicing  the Philosophy of Nonsense, which is just another way of saying: bullshit. William Lane Craig is the king of the bullshitters. He even has a degree in Theology Bullshit. 

And that's why I don't care about anything Craig has to say. Half the time what he says is painfully incoherent, the other half it is simply mad ravings of a delusional bullshitter. But you don't have to take my word for it.



Now that we know William Lane Craig is a compulsive liar, consider this following quote by Craig:

Should a conflict arise between the witness of the Holy Spirit to the fundamental truth of the Christian faith and beliefs based on argument and evidence, then it is the former which must take precedence over the latter, not vice versa.”  (Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, Revised edition, Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1994, p. 36.)

Translation: I know for a fact that there are fairies in my garden and a leprechaun living in my anus, but (BUT!) nothing you can say or show me will ever change my mind that I'm wrong, or even a little bit mistaken, because my brain waves are tuned into the divine frequency of--I'm right and you're wrong--neener neener. Suck it God-deniers!”

All this goes to show is that William Lane Craig is not a serious philosopher, rather, he is a Propagandist. He wants to spin the truth, to make it his truth, and then he wants you to take his truth--preferably bending over backwards with a sordid sort of smile on your face that says--no--but really--yes

So why won't I cut the guy some slack? Well, other than Craig's winning pearly white smile, he doesn't really have much else going for him. He constantly lies to bolster his arguments, he confuses terms which even an amateur philosopher is clear on, he misrepresents others--including experts he contends with, but worse, neglects to make amends for deliberately misconstruing the truth when called on his bullshit. Other than immense intellectual dishonesty, which makes me dislike him as a philosopher, and his smug confidence in knowing how infallibly right he is (because he has the little voice in his head Holy Spirit telling him as much), while he adheres to a theology which claims all those who disagree with him will burn in hell, I can't seem to find a single redeeming trait for why I shouldn't despise him as a person. 


As an advocate for science, reason, and intellectual integrity I simply am not going to cut the man any slack. He can ship up or take a good drilling for being a hack. Until then, I feel we all have an obligation to keep calling him on his bullshit.


Wednesday, September 29, 2010

The Problem With Kalam




The Problem With Kalam

Kalam, or more formally the Kalam cosmological argument as presented by the Christian theologian William Lane Craig states:

1.     The Cosmological Argument from Contingency

The cosmological argument comes in a variety of forms. Here’s a simple version of the famous version from contingency:

1.  Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.
2.  If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.
3.  The universe exists.
4.  Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence (from 1, 3).
5.  Therefore, the explanation of the universe’s existence is God (from 2, 4).

Now this is a logically airtight argument. That is to say, if the premises are true, then the conclusion is unavoidable. It doesn’t matter if we don’t like the conclusion. It doesn’t matter if we have other objections to God’s existence. So long as we grant the three premises, we have to accept the conclusion. So the question is this: Which is more plausible—that those premises are true or that they are false?

Herein lies the problem. The Kalam cosmological argument does not presuppose monotheism. In other words, there isn’t anything to suggest that it wasn’t a pantheon of minds/deities/gods which created the universe instead of just one. Why is this a problem? Consider the following logical argument:

1.      The inference that there was only one creating agent is true
2.      The inference that there was more than one creating agent is true
3.      Both can’t be simultaneously true
4.      Therefore, if 1 is true then 2 is false and if 2 is true then 1 is false
5.      Unable to defer to either 1 or 2 the possibility of neither/none

Therefore there is no direct corollary between the inference of any creating agent(s) and the causality of the universe. What does this mean? It means, that like a team of computer programmers toiling away to design a complex computer program, the universe could very well have been designed and brought into existence by an assembly of advanced thinking beings/deities. Furthermore there is no way to deduce whether it was one or a thousand gods who assumedly did the toiling. But since it can’t be both, and both are equally plausible and therefore equally unlikely, neither option can be justified by inference alone, thus none becomes the more likely option—leaving us right back where we started—at ground zero. Therefore the Kalam cosmological argument fails.

Possible Objections and Counter Objections
Actually, I don't think people discuss the personal/necessary being aspect of Craig's argument enough. Personally, I find this is where the chinks in the armor are. Many causes is a huge obstacle for Craig, which is why he keeps ducking the challenge of tackling it head on. Craig's response to this objection on his website Reasonable Faith is utterly lame. According to Craig:

The kalam argument is clearly not consistent with there being a group of deities cavorting with one another prior to the world’s creation, since the argument takes us back to a changeless state which is, I think, timeless. To imagine a group of timeless, unembodied minds somehow acting wholly in concert to create the world brings one awfully close to the doctrine of the Trinity. A Trinitarian (or Unitarian) concept of God seems much more plausible than polytheism’s many gods all independently existing timelessly and acting in concert to create the universe.

Craig might want to occasionally pause and think about what he is saying. As it is, he contradicts himself in the same sentence. First he says a group of deities (with multiple minds) is inconsistent with the Kalam cosmological argument and then reneges the statement immediately afterward to claim a triune deity (with multiple minds) works just fine. What is a trinity if not a group of three? Even if it is one Transcendent personal being, there are at least three distinct personalities/minds. Craig contradicts himself. Three is not one.

Craig still needs to provide a method which allows him to differentiate between one and the many, otherwise he's up the creek without a paddle. Maybe because he believes the Trinity to be one whole entity it's not three separate minds so much as a schizophrenic schism of personality types? How does he figure? He doesn't, he just expects you to agree with him--more special pleading. Likewise what is to differentiate between a necessary deity, existing in a changeless state, and two or more causal agents doing the same? Time is only an added dimension, and is relative, so has nothing to do with how many causes (or causal agents) there can ultimately be (in Transcendent form). 

Also, why can't a pantheon also act as a hive mind? The Borg in Star Trek the Next Generation can do it. I think Craig reveals the limits of his own imagination when he fails to consider such an obvious analogy. Now just make the Borg Transcendent beings, and presto! Craig thinks, for some odd reason, that a pantheon of gods working is concert is harder to grasp than one schizophrenic God. I don't see how a pantheon of, say, three polytheistic gods is harder to grasp than, oh well, a Triune being which is three in one. If you ask me, the concept of three in one is rather convoluted.

Craig simply dismisses the objection as if he's never really thought it through, which is why I have a hard time taking him seriously. He wants people to agree with him, but until he explains how Kalam predicts one necessary causal agent, which so happens to be a complex personal creator being with a schizophrenic personality, I think the objection of many causes is more than valid--it's completely devastating to Craig's entire argument.

Some other objections which might be raised include:

1.      Applying Occam’s razor we find that one god, or a God, is the simplest “explanation” and so has a better chance of being the correct inference. 

a.      Although Occam’s razor is a useful rule of thumb in weeding out unnecessary information, there is nothing the the Kalam cosmological argument which suggests a strict law of parsimony need be observed. Therefore my initial point that multiple gods are just as likely as an inference as one god stand as the primary objection to the validity of the Kalam cosmological argument. Additionally, what’s to suggest a conscious mind of a thinking god is less complex than a quantum event? Indeed, the rule of parsimony cannot be relied upon here. 

2.      Other cosmological evidence, such as fine-tuning and the argument of something rather than nothing, suggest an intentional set of laws which in turn denote a conscious act behind the intentionality of the predetermined parameters. 

a.      Again, there is nothing which presupposes monotheism, even as fine-tuning remains, in my opinion, the best chance of establishing a practical cosmological argument, it doesn’t go far enough to address the initial problem of many gods vs. one god, and so leaves us right back where we started. 

3.      The argument from reason seems to hint at the fact that our own consciousness is a necessary consequence of the detectable intentionality of a greater consciousness. 

a.      Even if we grant this, we cannot forget to overlook the fact that neuroscience offers a good preliminary model for human consciousness. Moreover, if granted, there is still no reason to assume a single consciousness over multiple or plural consciousnesses. What is to suggest that I don’t derive my consciousness from god X while you derive yours from god Y? Still the problem of aggregation remains.

I would predict any other objections will meet the same trouble, therefore my initial point that Kalam doesn’t presuppose monotheism remains valid. As such it still follows that there is no direct corollary between the inference of any creating agent(s) and the causality of the universe.

Identifying Weak Propositions
Whenever people argue over the deductive powers of the Kalam cosmological argument, or any other cosmological argument for that matter, I get confounded. By my reckoning there is no valid reason to even consider the argument or its deductions to begin with. The Kalam cosmological argument as offered by Craig and every other cosmological argument each fail in the same fashion.

Even if we assume the Kalam cosmological argument is true, at best it could only be an inference for a deistic creating agent, but not any specific type of god (personal or otherwise). If the theologian presupposes their version of God then they have simply taken out a qualification they needed to prove their case and are begging the question. Knowing this to be the case, any suggestion that the Kalam cosmological argument is a legitimate inference for God (because the universe exists, therefore must have been caused, thus proves that God is necessary to establish such causality) is simply special pleading.

In truth, however, hinging one’s entire proof for God on two faulty premises is by any epistemic standard a failed argument. Yet what theologian would be willing to admit that they are mistaken? Since such an admission would defeat their purpose of proving the existence of God and offering the argument in the first place they adamantly search for novel ways to keep believing in the validity of an illegitimate argument. Theologians like Craig love to flog a dead horse, hoping that your curiosity will be peaked by the bizarre and strange event long enough to compel you to come over to inquire what he’s on about. This gives the theologian the chance they need to urge you into buying their snake’s oil and have you listen to what they have to say and why they feel it is a valid argument—one that you couldn’t possibly refuse. They’ll likely throw in some ‘eternal salvation’ for free if you hurry up and buy now.

Conclusion
All considered, we find that the Kalam cosmological argument fails to establish any genuine inference that the universe was caused by a creator being whatsoever, and for that reason it is invalid. Simply put, the Kalam cosmological argument fails before it ever begins, and if you ask me that’s a telltale sign of a non-argument. If theologians were more honest with themselves they would reject the Kalam cosmological argument altogether, and without hesitation, on the basis that it is by all accounts something which simply cannot be true by inference alone. Of course, then they would not be able to say that the existence of the universe points to the existence of a divine ‘creator’ being. Well, too bad. I suggest we deal with it and move on.

THREE REASONS I.C.E SHOULDN’T EXIST (The Aftermath of Renee Good's Killing)

“Political language is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.” ― G...